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vABSTRACT 
Special Warfare forces are tasked with conducting operations in uncertain 
environments defined by rapidly changing environmental elements (instability) and the 
interaction of many diverse external factors (complexity). In order to succeed, 
organizations operating in uncertain environments should decentralize decision 
making to the appropriate level and emphasize an “organic” approach that 
focuses on the importance of people, adaptation, and innovation. The current 
USASOC bureaucracy, mirroring the conventional Army, is built to maximize internal 
efficiency and specialize in previously predicted scenarios. Due to persistently high 
operational tempo, personnel downsizing, and fiscal constraints, redesigning 
USASOC is not feasible at this time. However, the improvement of processes and 
incremental enhancement to align better with the operational environment within 
the existing design is possible. This study explores best practices from innovative 
and adaptive organizations that ARSOF can draw upon to increase its capability to 
conduct special warfare. Through the examination of these best practices, the study 
identified four key factors that lead to innovation: collaboration, organizational 
structure, incentives, and acceptance. This study recommends that Special 
Warfare forces apply these factors by increasing career flexibility, internal and 
external linkages through broadening opportunities and liaisons, and the collective 
intelligence of the organization through the use of cross-functional teams and 
increased communication measures. Adopting these enhancements may promote 
innovation and adaptation and increase Special Warfare forces’ contributions to 
national defense. 
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I. FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty is central to the respective identities of both special warfare and 
surgical strike forces. ARSOF 2022, the Special Warfare vision document, states that 
surgical strike forces undertake all efforts to reduce uncertainty in order to gain the 
necessary advantage. Conversely, special warfare forces are “designed to wade into 
uncertainty…and prevail.”1 Special warfare forces mitigate uncertainty through the 
fielding of self-contained forces “designed to accomplish its mission through and with 
indigenous surrogates and partners,”2 while surgical strike forces reduce uncertainty 
through detailed analysis and pinpoint accuracy.3 This acknowledgement of uncertainty 
in the operating environment establishes a benchmark against which both forces can 
design organizations and establish measures of effectiveness.  
To determine whether ARSOF are properly structured to conduct special warfare, 
one must establish the organizational design principles that best fit environments 
encountered when conducting special warfare. These principles can then be compared to 
the characteristics of the current ARSOF organizational design and the incompatibilities 
between the two. 
B. DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR SPECIAL WARFARE 
Special warfare forces are tasked with unconventional warfare, foreign internal 
defense, stability operations, counterinsurgency, and other activities in environments that 
range from permissive to non-permissive. These operations entail persistent and 
embedded partnerships with a network of defense and governmental organizations, both 
foreign and domestic. These multidimensional networks are constantly evolving as they 
interact with each other. Rapidly changing environmental elements (instability) and the 
interaction of many diverse external factors (complexity) are the characteristics of an 
                                                 
1 Charles T. Cleveland, ARSOF 2022 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2013), 16.  
2 Ibid., 11. 
3 Ibid.,10–11. 
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uncertain environment.4 Uncertainty is a defining characteristic of environments where 
special warfare forces operate.  
In his 2015 work, Team of Teams, General (Ret) Stanley McChrystal describes 
the difference between systems that are complicated and those that are complex. 
Complicated systems, analogous to an internal combustion engine, are those with many 
parts that are joined in relatively simple ways. Complexity is the description of “a diverse 
array of connected elements that interact frequently.” This dramatic increase in 
interactions between components creates environments that prevent effective prediction.5 
Building on this idea, in 2004 David Kilcullen described the increasing complexity of the 
future, (now current) operating environment as multilateral and ambiguous, with 
increasingly complex physical, human and informational terrain that “interact in a 
mutually reinforcing fashion.”6 
Instability compounds the issues created by complexity. Increased likeliness of 
change indicates that even if the complex environment was completely understandable, it 
will likely shift rapidly, making prior systems and knowledge inapplicable. In the 
technology industry, the rapid rate of advancement is one of the contributing factors to a 
shift in the “Static-Dynamic dimension” of an environment.7 Following the theory of 
Moore’s Law, this instability will continue to increase exponentially as new technologies 
continually disrupt markets.8 The abrupt entrance of a new technology can shift an entire 
industry and therefore requires a system that is able to withstand constant change.9 
Similarly, as the world becomes increasingly connected, and the U.S. continues to 
                                                 
4 Henry Mintzberg, “Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit?,” Harvard Business Review (Jan–Feb 
1981): 4.  
5 Stanley A. McChrystal, Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris Fussell, Team of Teams: New 
Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015), 56–57. 
6 Dave Kilcullen, Complex Warfighting (Sydney: Australian Army, 2004), 19. 
7 Robert Duncan, “Characteristics of Organizational Environments and Perceived Environment 
Uncertainty,” Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 17 Issue 3, (September 1972): 316. 
http://www.mcs.org.br/mbc/uploads/biblioteca/1158006928.32A.pdf  
8 “50 years of Moore’s Law,” accessed June, 14 2015, 
http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/silicon-innovations/moores-law-technology.html. 
9 Anna Lee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 80. 
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confront an evolving network of nation-states and non-state actors, the operating 
environment for special warfare forces will likely become increasingly unstable. 
Dr. Henry Mintzberg’s Harvard Business Review analysis of contingency theory 
and organizational structures defines uncertainty as a function of increasing complexity 
and increasing instability. Mintzberg states that organizations that operate in complex and 
unstable (uncertain) environments decentralize decision-making to the appropriate level 
and emphasize an “organic” approach that focuses on the importance of people, 
adaptation, and innovation.10 Uncertain environments necessitate organizations that 
measure effectiveness through the ability to adapt. This measure requires the ability to 
recognize the external environment and adjust the organization to meet situational 
requirements.11 Adaptation and innovation in response to uncertain environments requires 
increased connectivity and information sharing. This demand necessitates increased 
vertical and horizontal linkages within the organization and to its stakeholders.12  
C. ARSOF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN AND INCOMPATIBILITIES 
WITH SPECIAL WARFARE 
Over the past several years, USASOC has enacted several important 
organizational reforms in response to demands from the operational environment. These 
reforms include the establishment of the 1st Special Warfare Command, the Special 
Forces Group unconventional warfare capability redesign, Project Diane, and initiatives 
to institutionalize persistent engagement duty positions. ARSOF’s high levels of training, 
education, and an organizational focus on the importance of humans over hardware 
characterize differentiation between the conventional Army and ARSOF. While this 
focus on human capability is necessary and valuable, it falls short of providing an 
institutional capability to innovate and adapt commensurate with the complexity of the 
operational environment.  
                                                 
10 Mintzberg, “Organizational Design,” 8. 
11 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Parameters (December 1983): 336. 
12 Richard M. Burton and Borge Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics 
of Fit, 3rd ed. (Boston: Kluwer, 2004), 7. 
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The current ARSOF organizational design can be described as a combination of a 
professional and machine bureaucracy marked by standardization of work and skills. 
Machine bureaucracies are built to succeed in environments with greater levels of 
certainty while executing less-complex tasks; they maximize internal efficiency but lack 
the flexibility and specialization to adapt to uncertainty.13 They inherently focus on 
improving internal processes and efficiency, and tend to be “tall,” or have greater 
numbers of organizational echelons.14  
USASOC maintains this tall, hierarchical structure, with five or more levels of 
organization between the operational core and the commander. Current USASOC 
organizational structures above the operational core mirror those of the conventional 
Army, with standard divisional structures, coded staff positions and spans of control 
designed to prevent task saturation. This vertical organizational structure reduces 
information sharing and limits the use of cross-functional teams, while emphasizing 
standard operating procedures and rigid control systems to regulate the interaction of 
departments and subordinate units.  
As a non-deployable force provider headquarters, the purview of USASOC is 
necessarily limited to the preparation and sustainment of special operations forces. As 
subordinate units are deployed for operations, their aligned Theater Special Operations 
Commands (TSOC) employ them. This force provider/combatant command relationship 
is common across the military, and is not unique to USASOC. What makes USASOC 
unique is the regional alignment of its forces and its ability to provide these regionally 
aligned special operations forces to each of the TSOCs from the lowest levels 
(Detachment, Platoon) to an operational two star headquarters (1st Special Warfare 
Command).  
The implications of this design are that USASOC is tasked with preparing its 
forces to conduct operations, including special warfare. However, it does so from an 
organizational design that is optimized for administration, training, education, manning, 
                                                 
13 Mintzberg, “Organizational Design,” 8. 
14 Ibid. 
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sustainment, and deployment, largely mirroring the larger Army bureaucracy. To this 
end, the areas of emphasis are adherence to standard operating procedures, protocols, 
maintenance of equipment, and personnel management. While these functions are 
necessary and valuable in order to maintain standards and ensure compliance, special 
warfare forces are then deployed to operate in support of the TSOC in operational areas 
defined by complexity and uncertainty. Within this construct, the time should be spent 
preparing for operating in uncertainty and complexity is dominated by interaction within 
standardized bureaucratic constraints. These efforts are misaligned.  
ARSOF 2022 describes the vision for the optimization of the interdependence 
between ARSOF, Conventional Forces, and Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and 
Multinational (JIIM) partners. It describes the endstate that “USASOC optimizes the 
force multiplying potential of partnership with the Army and interagency to provide the 
nation with seamless combat power.”15 The uncertain and complex environment that 
necessitates Special Warfare requires constant communication and horizontal integration 
between nodes in the network.  
General (Ret) Stanley McChrystal, in his exploration of organizational 
development Team of Teams, draws from Sandy Pentland’s work, Social Physics, in 
distilling the two largest determinants of idea flow within an organization. Pentland finds 
that “engagement,” or problem-solving within a team or unit, and “exploration,” or 
frequent contact with other teams or entities enables idea flow and builds the collective 
intelligence of an organization.16 In order to maximize the collective intelligence of an 
organization, it must be connected within itself and with a diverse set of outside entities.  
Despite the unity of command in the newly created 1st Special Warfare 
Command, there is limited integration of Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological 
Operations Forces prior to deployment into the theater of operation. The Special Warfare 
components offer mutually supporting capability and maintain parallel regional 
alignment. However, the three functions above remain separate as distinct and 
                                                 
15 Cleveland, ARSOF 2022, 17. 
16 McChrystal, Team of Teams, 196; Sandy Pentland, Social Physics: How Good Ideas Spread- the 
Lessons from a New Science (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 61, 19–20. 
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nonintegrated units with few horizontal coordination mechanisms. In accordance with  
the design of bureaucratic organizations, it is the role of the parent headquarters to 
accomplish most of the coordination between the units.17 Furthermore, limited 
infrastructure exists to integrate interagency partners and ARSOF into cohesive Special 
Warfare teams and networks prior to arrival in theater. These integration seams and 
capability gaps require ARSOF to form cohesive teams without the benefit of habitual 
engagement with other special warfare units and institutionalized interaction with the 
interagency. The absence of well-developed organizational connections between special 
warfare units prevents the formation of necessary mutually adjusting networks that 
habitually communicate prior to employment. 
Similar to the absence of internal linkages, special warfare forces currently have 
limited channels of communication with interagency entities that have a stake in special 
warfare operations and campaigns. Without persistent organizational ties with multiple 
levels within the interagency, habitual and widespread collaboration is limited, and 
special warfare forces are prevented from maximizing their collective intelligence.  
However tempting, it is not feasible or realistic to redesign the USASOC 
organization. The current environment of persistently high operational tempo, personnel 
downsizing, and fiscal constraints denies the time, space, and will of the organization to 
attempt such a daunting and potentially risky overhaul. More feasible, however, is the 
improvement of processes and incremental enhancement to align with the operational 
environment within the existing design.  
Edward Luttwak, in his work “Notes on Low Intensity Conflict” describes two 
approaches to organizing and preparing for war, attrition based and relational maneuver. 
The attritional warfare approach strives to optimize the most efficient and overwhelming 
technological and organizational advantage. In doing so, attrition warfare strives “to 
develop an optimal set of organizational formats, methods, and tactics which are then to 
be applied whenever possible with the least modification, because any modification must 
                                                 
17 Mintzberg, “Organizational Design,” 6. 
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be suboptimal.”18 This focus on internal processes and optimization limits adaptation to 
the external environment. Conversely, forces “with a high relational maneuver content 
cannot usually maximize process efficiencies and cannot logically develop optimal 
organizational formats, methods, and tactics. Instead, each must be relational, i.e., 
reconfigured ad hoc for theater, the enemy and the situations.”19 As a result of its 
inflexibility, the attrition warfare approach declines in effectiveness in the realm of low 
intensity conflict, while relational maneuver forces become increasingly valuable.20  
The Army has a long and successful tradition of creating, training, and grooming 
experts at controlling moving pieces. The U.S. Army as a whole is incentivized to 
continue to develop leaders that show the highest competence in maneuvering forces in 
the battlespace, supporting the attrition approach to warfare. In order to measure this 
ability, measures of effectiveness are often replaced by measures of task proficiency. This 
subtle shift replaces adaptability in the face of uncertainty and mission success with 
performance of standard procedures.21 This preference aligns core competency of the 
Army as a whole.  
It is the relational maneuver capability, however, that ARSOF provides to the 
Army. As such, its measure of effectiveness should be its ability to adapt to its 
environment and innovate solutions in the face of uncertainty. Incentive systems play a 
key role in shaping this capability. ARSOF Officers and Non-commissioned Officers 
(NCOs) are incentivized very similarly to their counterparts in the rest of the Army. The 
U.S. Army Human Resource Command (HRC) is the centralized headquarters that directs 
the administration of Soldiers of all ranks and branches. HRC’s promotion and incentive 
systems are common across all branches of the Army. In particular, the Command Select 
List (CSL) boards that select individuals to command units at the Battalion level and 
above are manned by personnel from across the branches of the Army. Currently 
                                                 
18 Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,”13. 
19 Ibid., 13. 
20 Ibid., 14. 
21 Stanley McChrystal (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 13, 2015).  
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USASOC provides guidance to the representatives on CSL boards as to what constitutes 
success in key developmental positions.  
Despite this influence, ARSOF maintains a similar incentive and career 
progression that largely mirrors requirements for the attrition-oriented branches of the 
Army. Adherence to this system results in ARSOF leaders that are incentivized to shape 
their careers in concert with the values and progression of attrition warfare leaders. This 
fundamental difference in desired leader attributes and actions prevents USASOC from 
incentivizing the necessary innovation and adaptation to align its force with the demands 
of special warfare in complex environments. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The emergence of these incompatibilities between USASOC’s organizational 
design and the conduct of special warfare led to the question: what best practices from 
innovative and adaptive organizations can ARSOF use to increase its capability to 
conduct special warfare?  
E. METHODS 
In order to best understand the broad subject of innovation as it bears upon this 
study, the research team focused the literature review in the areas of organizational 
design theory, idea development in organizations, military innovation, and corporate 
approaches to innovation. From the literature, four factors emerged that increased the 
innovative capacity and adaptability of organizations: collaboration, organizational 
structure, incentives, and acceptance.
22
  
The group then selected and examined cases of private sector and military 
innovation, examining if and where the factors of innovation were present. In order to 
                                                 
22 In order for an idea to become an innovation it must gain acceptance from within the originating 
organization and in a market of end users. For this study the term acceptance defines the process of 
building buy-in within an organization for the idea or product, and recognizing a demand for a product or 
idea and delivering to its end users. This term was derived from the works of Victor A Thomas 
“Bureaucracy and Innovation” Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 10 No.1, (June 1965): 2. and Loren R. 
Graham, Lonely Ideas: Can Russia Compete? (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2013), x.  
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bridge the gap between private sector firms and Department of Defense entities, cases 
were selected with several key attributes in common with special warfare forces. Cases 
include organizations that are established and mature, operate across multiple cultures, 
markets, or demographics, and produce multiple outputs matched against multiple 
problem sets.  
Based on this exploration, the information was compiled to present an analysis of 
each organization’s use of organizational design, methods of collaboration, incentives, 
and acceptance to increase their capacity to innovate and adapt to best advance their 
position in the market or service provided. These principles and observations were then 
applied to special warfare forces in the form of recommendations to increase the 
organizational capability to innovate and adapt. 
  
 10
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to navigate the full spectrum of literature on innovation, the research 
group utilized a system to progress towards refined analysis on innovation practices. The 
first goal was to understand organizations and learn how they develop ideas. This 
established a base of knowledge from which to understand the fundamentals of 
innovation. The second goal was to understand how military organizations innovate. This 
provided an understanding of how organizational theory and creativity apply to the 
context of special warfare. The third goal was to learn innovation from the perspective of 
businesses. These lessons could then be compared to those obtained from studying 
military innovation in order to establish themes for further exploration. Once these 
categories were thoroughly understood, the group could effectively analyze selected 
cases to compare specific innovative practices to those identified in the literature review. 
This literature review is thus organized into the following sections: organizational 
design theory, idea development in organizations, military innovation, and corporate 
approaches to innovation. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN THEORY 
In his article for the Harvard Business Review, “Organizational Design: Fashion 
or Fit,” Henry Mintzberg derives and builds a model for analyzing organizational design. 
He posits that most organizations fall into natural configurations based on their 
requirements and environment. Mintzberg organizes his analysis of best-fit organizational 
structures in relation to the dimensions of task complexity and instability, which are 
defined as the interaction of many diverse external factors and changing environmental 
elements, respectively.23 
 
                                                 
23 Mintzberg, “Organizational Design,” 4. 
 12
A machine bureaucracy is the natural configuration of an organization in a stable 
environment with simple tasks.24 Machine bureaucracies are built to coordinate by 
standardizing work and maximize efficiency through internal regulations and controls. 
Professional bureaucracies are designed to coordinate through standardized skills and 
professional competency; they are characterized by high specialization, education, and 
training. It fits best in a stable environment with complex task requirements. 
Mintzberg indicates that organizations that conduct complex tasks in unstable 
environments must decentralize decision-making to the appropriate level and emphasize 
an organic approach that focuses on the importance of people, adaptation, and innovation. 
In these uncertain environments, groups and organizations interact using mutual 
adjustment rather than established behavior controls and standard operating procedures. 
He labels this form the adhocracy. 
Burton and Obel’s 2004 Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design defines 
the organizational design problem as creating “an organizational design that matches the 
demand for information.” That is, “the greater the uncertainty of the task, the greater the 
amount of information that has to be processed between decision-makers.” In response to 
this dilemma, “organizations can either increase their ability to process information or 
decrease the amount of information needed to process.”25 Burton and Obel use structural 
contingency theory as the framework to solve this matching or fit problem. The 
organizational diagnosis and design fit process consists of optimizing the organizational 
design and culture creation to the variables of leadership, organizational climate, skill 
sets, environment, technology and strategy. The outcomes are measured against 
optimization of the fit criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and viability.26 
Using Burton and Obel’s method of optimization, the organizational diagnosis 
and design fit process consists of maximizing both the organizational design and culture 
creation to the variables of leadership, organizational climate, skill sets, environment, 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 4. 
25 Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design, 7. 
26 Ibid., 20. 
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technology and strategy. The outcomes are measured against optimization under the 
criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and viability.27  
Burton and Obel’s concepts are further supported by Driver, Brousseau, and 
Hunsaker’s adaptation of the Yerkes-Dodson model. This model represents the 
relationship between information processing and environmental load. Given the large 
amount of information to be processed in a complex environment, a centralized 
hierarchal organization will fail when the leadership is overloaded with information and 
their performance declines.28 Information load capacity will vary with individual 
experience, and increased environmental load will improve performance until overload is 
reached. By reducing the impediments to work and preventing employees from becoming 
overloaded with ancillary tasks, organizations create a culture and environment 
conducive to innovation. 
In his basic organizational text, Richard Daft defines culture as “the set of values, 
beliefs, understandings, and ways of thinking that is shared by members of an 
organization and taught to new members as correct.”29 He discusses how culture is an 
everyday component of any organization. Members or employees participate in the 
organizations culture generally without notice, until the basic cultural norms or values of 
the organization are challenged or changed. He posits that an organization’s culture exists 
on two levels: observable symbols and underlying values.30 Daft uses the image of an 
iceberg to demonstrate the relationship between the observable signs of an organizations 
culture and the underlying values and norms that support that culture.31 The unspoken  
and often unseen underlying assumptions and beliefs greatly impact the culture of an 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 20. 
28 Philip Hunsaker, Kenneth Brousseau, Mike Driver, The Dynamic Decision Maker (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1990), 40.  
29 Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organizational Theory & Design, (Mason, Ohio: South-Western 
College Publishing, 2003), 112 also supported by Vijay Sathe’s definition of culture as “the set of 
important assumptions (often unstated) that members of a community share in common.” He asserts that 
culture is often hard to define because the shared assumptions of the people that make up an organization 
can be more difficult to interpret than their communications. Vijay Sathe, Culture and Related Corporate 
Realities, (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin INC., 1985), 10–11. 
30 Daft, Essentials of Organizational Theory & Design, 112. 
31 Ibid., 113. 
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organization. A complex working environment, such as the technology industry, by 
definition has many diverse variables and a large information load that influence an 
organization.32  
In his 1968 book, The Temporary Society, Warren Bennis explained the need to 
depart from traditional structures in order to operate in an increasingly changing world.33 
Alvin Toffler built off the ideas of Bennis and proposed the concept of the adhocracy.34 
Under this construct, an organization has the structure to develop new ideas and 
implement them more effectively than traditional models. Both these organizational 
theorists laid the foundation for concepts that would eventually be adopted by some of 
the most innovative institutions in modern business. 
C. IDEA DEVELOPMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS 
Steven Kerr’s article “On the Folly of Rewarding A While Hoping for B,” 
explains the importance of properly structured incentives. Kerr states that “organisms 
seek information concerning what activities are rewarded, and then seek to do (or at least 
pretend to do) those things, often to the virtual exclusion of activities not rewarded.”35 
Kerr emphasizes the importance of using incentives to align the goals of individuals with 
the desired goals of the organization. If the goal of an organization is to win a war, the 
individuals within that organization should share that as a personal goal. As Kerr 
describes in a comparison between World War II and Vietnam, the army is less effective 
at winning a war when the majority of its soldiers are primarily focused on surviving 
their tour rather than personally concerned with the overall outcome of their collective 
efforts.36 Incentives form naturally based on personal perspectives and must be 
understood by leadership in order to properly align organization member behavior. 
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33 Warren Bennis, The Temporary Society (New York: Harper Row, 1968). 
34 Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), 125. 
35 Steven Kerr, “On the Folly of Rewarding A While Hoping for B,” Academy of Management 
Executive Vol I. No. 1(1995): 7. 
36 Kerr, “On the Folly of Rewarding A While Hoping for B,” 8. 
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In support of Kerr’s ideas, expectancy theory explains a person’s goal-driven 
motivations. Fred Lunenburg summarizes expectancy theory as having “three key 
elements: expectancy, instrumentality, and valence. A person is motivated to the degree 
that he or she believes that (a) effort will lead to acceptable performance (expectancy), 
(b) performance will be rewarded (instrumentality), and (c) the value of the rewards is 
highly positive (valence).”37  
In his book Group Genius, Keith Sawyer argues that collaboration is the most 
critical aspect of innovation. Innovation is not the work of a lone genius but the result of 
collaborative efforts that achieve sparks of applicable ideas.38 Information flow and 
building upon externally developed ideas are inextricable elements of innovation. This 
collaboration, however, requires guidance and focus in order to produce effective 
results.39 
Sawyer gives an example of classic innovation in the creation of the mountain 
bike: the design for mountain bikes formed through groups of bicycle riders that came 
across each other riding along steep California trails. In the 1970s, no company produced 
bicycles specifically for this purpose. As these groups got together, they each noticed 
little changes that they implemented into their road bikes that helped to maneuver on 
steep grades. Over time and through increasingly large social gatherings, these groups 
combined their ideas; handlebar changes, brake modifications, etc. and an innovative 
design emerged. This design for a bicycle ideal for mountain riding quickly entered the 
mainstream and the bicycle industry leaders realized they would have to produce this new 
style in order to compete in the market.40 
 
                                                 
37 Fred C. Lunenburg, “Expectancy Theory of Motivation: Motivating by Altering Expectations,” 
International Journal of Management, Business, and Administration. Vol 15 No. 1 (2011): 1–6. 
38 Keith Sawyer, Group Genius (New York: Basic Books, 2007), Kindle edition, loc 212. 
39 Ibid., loc 213. 
40 Ibid., loc 39.  
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Keith Sawyer’s studies revealed that insights emerge in individuals as a result of 
previous collaboration.41 The Wright brothers reached their historical innovation by 
building off of previous ideas and then continuing successive development through their 
own interaction.42 Even the most creative accomplishments in humanity can be attributed 
to groups of talented individuals sharing ideas. Claude Monet, and Auguste Renoir were 
not solely responsible for their brilliant work. They were part of a closely knit group of 
impressionists who shared ideas and communicated regularly.43 
The innovative capacity of high rates of collaboration is comparable to the 
chemical process known as auto-catalysis. Vinod Khosla, co-founder of Sun 
Microsystems, explains in “The Innovator’s Ecosystem” that the interaction of various 
types of chemicals in the appropriate environment is similar to the science behind 
innovative systems. When certain chemicals are combined, they catalyze and create a 
reactant which further catalyzes the compound.44 Khosla applies this concept, as it relates 
to complexity theory, to human interaction. “When an idea is successful (even if 
incremental), it combines with other successful ideas, creating new ideas at an ever faster 
pace. . .”45 Sun Microsystems and the high paying clients of Khosla’s consulting firm are 
not the only organizations to recognize the innovative value of collaboration. It is a 
common theme among the most innovative companies in America. 
Ron Adner’s review of collaborative innovation, The Wide Lens: What 
Successful Innovators See That Others Miss establishes a baseline of analysis for 
organizations desiring to improve innovation and collaboration. Adner establishes that 
within the private sector, rapidly evolving competition from increasingly responsive  
 
 
                                                 
41 Sawyer, Group Genius, loc 121. 
42 Ibid., loc 158 
43 Ibid., loc 230 
44 Jeffrey Steinfeld, Joseph Francisco, and William Hayes, Chemical Kinetics and Dynamics, second 
edition, (Upper Saddle Wood, NJ: Prentice Hall), 151. 
45 Vinod Khosla, “The Innovator’s Ecosystem,” (http://www.khoslaventures.com/wp-
content/uploads/The-Innovator%E2%80%99s-Ecosystem.pdf ). 
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competitors force businesses to collaborate within the delivery chain in order to be 
successful. This collaboration increases potential output and profitability while 
simultaneously increasing risks, if not properly managed.46 Therefore, partnership in 
innovation can lead to failure, as an organization’s success becomes vulnerable to the 
strengths and weaknesses of organizations outside the control of the innovating firm.47 
Wise innovators carefully analyze the links in their chain of collaboration to ensure their 
product adds value to each collaborator, thereby incentivizing a profitable process for all. 
An effective strategy for collaboration must account for the interdependence of 
stakeholders in the innovation process.48  
Networks are key to building the type of collaboration that capitalizes on ideas 
from varied organizations. According to Patti Anklam in Net Work, a network is a 
collection of nodes and ties with a common purpose. The nodes can be individuals, 
groups, or organizations. The strength of a network is usually formed through a dense 
connection of ties as opposed to capitalizing on strong, isolated, internal nodes. 
Organizations that close themselves off to external ties are denying the inherent 
advantages of interconnectivity. On the other hand, a node with the ability to strengthen 
the network through an increased density of ties is known to have strong social capital. 
This social capital is key to building the collaboration necessary to compete in a complex 
environment.49 
D. MILITARY INNOVATION 
Edward Luttwak describes in “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare” that in using a 
direct approach, a conventional, less adaptive force seeks to overwhelm with superior 
resources and firepower through efficient centralized execution.50 However, in order to  
 
                                                 
46 Ron Adner, The Wide Lens: A New Strategy for Innovation (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2012), 
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47 Ibid., 25. 
48 Ibid., 157. 
49 Patti Ankam, Net Work (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007), Kindle Edition, loc 420, 798. 
50 Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” 336. 
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meet the demands of Special Warfare, ARSOF must be designed to accomplish the tasks 
of relational maneuver (indirect approach) as well. Luttwak describes the indirect 
approach as operations by an unorthodox, highly adaptive force that seeks to recognize 
the aspects of the external environment and adjust its own organization and methods to 
meet situational requirements.51 This adjustment of the organization and methods 
requires innovation and creativity to keep pace with the operational demands. 
Barry Posen, in his work The Sources of Military Doctrine analyzes military 
doctrine and its effects on the state security of Britain, France, and Germany during the 
interwar period. Posen uses organizational theory and balance of power theory as 
instruments to assess a state’s grand strategy. Posen posits that military organizations will 
seldom innovate on their own. Consistent with organizational theory, he asserts that 
organizations dislike uncertainty and therefore instinctively avoid the major changes to 
operations and processes that entail uncertainty. Furthermore, military organizations are 
hierarchical, and those at the top of the hierarchy tend to restrict idea flow and maintain 
previously mastered practices, rather than accepting new ones. He then summarizes that 
because of these organizational constraints, military innovation tends to occur after a 
large defeat or is due to civilian intervention.52 Militaries have cultural and bureaucratic 
resistance to change and often adjust to changes in warfare after suffering major losses.53 
If an organization does not have the internal structure to facilitate the implementation of 
useful ideas, an external element with significant influence can force the change. 
In “New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation,” Stephen Rosen 
defines militaries as “complex political communities” and therefore “innovation requires 
                                                 
51 Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” 336. 
52 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World 
Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).  
53 Supported by evidence of Russian innovation after Operation Barbarossa. David M. Glantz, “The 
Red mask: The nature and legacy of Soviet military deception in the Second World War,” Intelligence and 
National Security 2:3 (1987): 177. Also supported by changes from the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Whittaker, 
Alan G., Brown, Shannon A., Smith, Frederick C., & McKune, Elizabeth, “The National Security Policy 
Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System,” Annual Research Report (August 15, 
2011). 
 19
an ideological struggle” that will produce a “new theory of victory.”54 According to 
Rosen, legitimacy in military organizations comes from victory in military operations. To 
seek legitimacy, militaries will attempt to determine what future operational 
environments will exist and how the organization will achieve success operating in those 
environments; this becomes a new theory of victory. The theory must then be translated 
into critical tasks and missions that are accepted by the service. The tasks must be defined 
and measures of effectiveness must be created as well. Officers and subordinate units will 
then be judged by their ability to perform these new tasks. If the organization fails to 
reformulate new tasks and measures of effectiveness, the innovation may become 
irrelevant and will not change the organizations behavior. Rosen continues by asserting 
that political power in in military organizations is gained by influencing who reaches 
senior command positions. A career path for those innovative officers who subscribe to 
the “new theory of victory” must be made in order to prevent them from being pigeon 
holed into a specialty position that offers no future for senior command. Rosen believes 
that innovation in military organizations tends to occur from the top down, although the 
innovative ideas can come from the bottom up. This exemplifies that the institution must 
be complicit for change to occur in a military organization.55  
Rosen attributes faster innovation in wartime than in peacetime to the fact that 
“bad commanders can be relieved and bureaucratic routines bypassed more easily.”56 
Without the dynamics of wartime, he argues, military innovation is a 20-year process 
dependent on appropriate assessment of future requirements. If the future environment 
can be predicted accurately, the institutional changes will affect incoming junior officers, 
and over time they will be making the critical decisions through a new perspective.57 The 
advantages provided by wartime innovation are the only means to affecting innovation in 
a timeframe suitable for the contemporary operating environment. 
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Dima Adamsky of Stanford University examines the history of military 
innovation during the revolution of military affairs in his book The Culture of Military 
Innovation. Adamsky states that there were three unique responses to the revolution in 
military affairs from the three nations. The Soviets were the first to conceive of the “new 
theory of victory,” and their conceptualization of the revolution in military affairs 
preceded their technological procurement and combat experience.58 Conversely, in the 
American and Israeli cases, technological gains far preceded the realization that the 
nature of warfare had changed.59  
While the Soviets contemplated the impact of the technological leaps, they lacked 
the industrial capability to stay astride the west in the development of technology. This 
combined with the Russian culture’s comparative emphasis on declarative knowledge, 
and the relative importance of understanding over acting and implementing, ensured that 
the Soviets never fully executed their superior thoughts and ideas.60 In contrast, the 
American fixation on quick results, opposition to long wars, and fixation on new 
technologies led to a reliance on technology as a cure-all for national security 
challenges.61 The Israelis developed a regionally peerless defense industry and became 
similarly fixated on the power of technology, at the price of an understanding of the 
vision of future warfare. Furthermore, great importance was placed on “promoting 
practitioners over theoreticians,” and the IDF developed an anti-academic and anti-
intellectual tradition.62 Thus, “the IDF operated without long term conceptual and 
doctrinal vision,” and this tactical capability and focus produced an inability to perceive 
game-changing shifts in the nature of war and military thought.63 
Hy Rothstein provides a useful summary of military innovation in waging 
unconventional warfare in his 2006 work Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of 
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Unconventional Warfare. Rothstein draws from a lengthy list of works studying 
bureaucracy, contingency theory, and the role of the military in innovation. With respect 
to organizational theory, Rothstein concludes that contingency theory is an effective 
model for designing organizations to conduct operations in uncertain environments with 
high task complexity. Rothstein further summarizes the implications from literature 
discussing innovation as applied to the conduct of unconventional warfare with nine 
propositions.64 
1. Innovation in military organizations is difficult and often requires outside 
intervention.65 
2. Military organizations cope with uncertainty by developing standardized 
procedures and by distributing authority to enforce these procedures.66 
3. Those who hold power and authority in an organization have a vested 
interest in the doctrine associated with their status.67 
4. Innovation can be internally generated by the desire of professional 
officers to secure the state as well as by the promise of more resources.68 
5. Scientific entrepreneurship helps develop technologies that can instigate 
innovation.69 
6. Innovation is the result of individuals and their ideas.70 
7. Organizational culture can either facilitate or deter innovation.71 
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8. Organizational culture is shaped by incentive structures that operate in the 
organization.72 
9. The interests of an organization determine what it thinks about a given 
innovation.73 
These premises provide a roadmap for understanding the causes and impediments 
of military innovation. Application of organizational design theory or private sector 
innovation to the ARSOF can be viewed through the framework of these propositions. 
Dave Kilcullen developed the Australian Army’s Future Land Operational 
Concept (FLOC) in Complex Warfighting. In this doctrinal work he explains that “Land 
Forces for complex warfighting must be optimized for versatility, agility and 
orchestration.” Building on previous military strategists and his own research on 
contemporary battlefields, he illustrates the key elements necessary to succeed in the 21st 
century. He universally applies versatility, agility, and orchestration as essential elements 
of future land forces operating in an increasingly complex environment.74  
In The Generals, Thomas Ricks asserts that the U.S. military has experienced a 
steady decline in the efficacy of general officers. He attributes this to a poor incentive and 
promotion system that rewards risk aversion and promotes mediocrity.75 He further 
argues that few American generals have been competent in recent military conflicts yet 
there are no consequences for their failures as opposed to World War II when leaders at 
all echelons were fired for poor performance.76 According to Ricks, “adaptability and risk 
taking largely had been bred out of American Generals.”77 
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E. CORPORATE APPROACHES TO INNOVATION 
Jeff Dyer, Hal Gregersen, and Clayton M. Christensen conducted a six-year study 
to identify the skills common among top innovative leaders and published the work as 
The Innovator’s DNA for the Harvard Business Review Press. Dyer, Gregersen, and 
Christensen identified five increasable skills that separate creative and innovative leaders 
from their peers: associating, questioning, observing, experimenting, and networking.78 
They also noted that executives are seldom the direct source of innovation, rather, they 
create and facilitate environments where innovation flourishes. 
The Innovator’s DNA describes associating as the ability to “connect seemingly 
wildly different ideas, objects, services, technologies, and disciplines to dish up new and 
unusual innovations.”79 Furthermore, Innovators question. They seek to ask hard 
questions to challenge the status quo, and they embrace opposite paradigms and 
intellectual constraints.80 
The majority of innovators are observers. They produce new ideas by observing 
and understanding the desired intent of those doing a job and by recognizing how 
solutions from different contexts can be applied to new problems.81 
Experimenting is the fourth skill. “Like scientists, innovative entrepreneurs 
actively try out new ideas by creating prototypes and launching pilots.”82 This attitude is 
characterized by Edison’s famous quote, “I haven’t failed. I’ve simply found 10,000 
ways that do not work.”83 The final skill is networking. Innovative leaders network to 
encounter new perspectives from diverse thinkers and actors in disparate fields.84 
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To extrapolate the individual skills of innovators into organizational design, The 
Innovator’s DNA presents three central ideas. First, innovative firms select personnel 
based on the five discovery skills and hold the most qualified in key leadership positions. 
Innovative organizations then create internal processes “that mirror the individual 
discovery behaviors.”85 These behaviors are supported by four philosophies that support 
innovation as a core capability, and motivate people to align themselves accordingly: 
“innovation is everyone’s job, disruptive innovation is part of the, deploy lots of small 
properly organized innovation project teams, and take smart risks in the pursuit of 
innovation.”86  
In their article for the Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies, 
“Strategic Leadership and Entrepreneurial Capability for Game Change,” Abdelgawad, 
Zahra, Svejenovea, and Sapienza assert that senior leadership in an existing organization 
is critical in creating the capability to realize game changing outcomes, which are the 
result of Entrepreneurial Capability (EC).87 EC is “a means of sensing, selecting, shaping, 
and synchronizing internal and external conditions for the exploration and exploitation of 
opportunities.” Furthermore, “EC involves both the exploration and exploitation of 
opportunities to synchronize and shape emergent conditions internal and external to the 
firm.”88   
Leaders create EC by incentivizing and aligning people in organizations to gather 
and present new information, including challenging the status quo and those practices 
that are “taken for granted.” This process is referred to as sensing. Second, leaders select 
from a broad range of ideas, including those that may be contradictory and subject them 
to rigorous analysis. Third, leaders shape their organization to match the ideas and 
actions selected through reconfiguration of existing capability, transposing knowledge 
from outside sources, alignment of proponency for particular ideas or courses of action. 
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Finally, leaders ensure that the organization is synchronized through alignment of internal 
processes and capabilities to external resources to enable effective creation of outputs.89 
Developed EC has several positive effects on an organization’s capability and influence. 
EC increases an organization’s ability to realize opportunities exist and create avenues to 
exploit those opportunities. Externally, exploited opportunities transform an 
organization’s ecosystem.90 Internally, EC increases the organization’s ability to create 
novelty (innovate), and more rapidly initiate game changing strategies.91 
“Change is pervasive; the key strategic challenge facing managers of 
contemporary businesses is managing this change.”92 In Competing on the Edge: Strategy 
as Structured Chaos, Brown and Eisenhardt discuss strategies for businesses that need to 
consistently anticipate the change in the environment and markets in order to stay ahead 
of their competitors. The authors divide the cases they examine and the lessons they draw 
into three major areas: strategy, organization, and leadership. Through these areas, Brown 
and Eisenhardt seek to learn how the managers of organizations in the computer industry 
cope with the fast-paced volatile marketplace where the slogan is “have lunch or be 
lunch.”93 The rules that Brown and Eisenhardt offer for “competing on the edge” seem 
applicable to any organization that must render management solutions when facing 
constant change. The themes presented by Brown and Eisenhardt offer helpful advice for 
organizations that seek to bolster innovation and expand creative culture. 
F. IDENTIFIED INNOVATION THEMES 
The research group identified four themes emerging from the previously 
described works and supporting literature: collaboration, structure, incentives, and 
acceptance. Of these, no single theme identifies a lynchpin for innovation. Instead, they 
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each include factors that build on an organization’s ability to innovate and adapt. For 
example, the machine bureaucracy is not a favorable structure for idea development, yet 
innovative ideas can emerge from within such an organization. It is more likely, however, 
that ideas emerge from an adhocracy.94  
1. Collaboration 
Organizations with high rates of collaboration increase idea flow by involving a 
diverse array of specialists to bring unique insight into a problem. This is aided by an 
organization’s structure, its culture, and connections to an external network.95 
2. Structure 
Modern organizational theorists recognize the creation and implementation of 
new ideas are more likely in certain structures than in others. Increasing horizontal 
instead of vertical linkages facilitates the flat and highly connected structure common in 
most of today’s innovative organizations.96  
3. Incentives 
Innovation is stimulated by aligning incentives to traits and activities that align 
with and support innovation and adaptation. Innovation may be discussed, and mandated 
by organizational leadership, yet if there is no process for rewarding that innovation, it is 
unlikely to catch on among members.97 
4. Acceptance 
Innovative ideas must be accepted at all levels in an organization in order to be 
completely implemented. For this study the term “acceptance” is the process of building  
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buy-in within an organization for an idea or product, and recognizing a demand for a 
product or idea and delivering to its end users.98 This is especially difficult in the 






                                                 
98 This term was derived from the works of Victor A Thomas “Bureaucracy and Innovation” 
Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 10 No.1 (June 1965): 2, and Loren R. Graham, Lonely Ideas: Can 
Russia Compete? (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2013), x. 
99 Identified through the previously cited works of Posen, Rosen, Adamsky, Daft, Adner, Rothstein, 
Ricks, and Abdelgawad. 
 
 28




This chapter presents examples of organizations that exhibit innovative and 
adaptive practices. These organizations are not only innovative but also extremely 
successful within their respective fields. These organizations possess several key 
attributes in common with special warfare forces. The cases include organizations that 
are established and mature, operate across multiple cultures, markets, or demographics, 
and produce diverse outputs matched against unstable or complex problem sets.  
First, the group chose to examine Google as an example of an adaptable organic 
organization that tends to exist in the uncertain environment of the technology industry. 
The second case, JSOC, represents a military organization that has modified its 
organizational design to match the networked design of its adversaries. The third case 
study examines why a particular geographical area, Silicon Valley, contains such a high 
concentration of innovative organizations. The last case examines several organizations 
from outside the military and technology industries to evaluate innovative practices from 
the manufacturing, design, food, and beverage industries. In sum, this chapter seeks to 
illuminate best practices from these organizations from a variety of industries. 
B. GOOGLE 
Google is one of the most successful tech companies of the information age, and 
it is well known through contemporary media for its creative culture. The company 
intentionally creates a workspace very different from conventional corporate America. 
Today Google has over 40,000 employees working at more than 70 offices in 40 
countries across the world.100 However, the roots of Google’s philosophy were seeded 
when the fledgling company was formed on the Stanford campus by its founders Larry 
100 “About Google,” accessed October 14, 2015, 
https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/company/facts/locations/. 
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Page and Sergey Brin.101 Page and Brin proceeded to build the multi-billion 
dollar company from a startup based out of a garage in Menlo Park, California.102  
In the Plex, Steven Levy conveys the “dorm room” mentality throughout the 
massive Mountain View, California Google office complex as a replication of the 
environment in which the company began.103 Google intentionally creates a work 
environment that facilitates interaction and creativity while avoiding conventional office 
designs intended to increase efficiency.  
Google maintains a structure of fluid collaboration despite growing to a company 
of over 53,000 employees.104 Always seeking to capitalize on the concept of dorm room 
and garage style offices of its origin, the strategic vision of the company ensures that 
employees of different specialties are constantly interacting and combining their genius 
in order to develop new and innovative products.105 Through the lens of organizational 
design theory, Google’s structure can be described as an adhocracy with temporary, 
cross-functional teams.106 Google maintains a loose administrative structure with many 
functional areas. These different functions do not have distinctly defined lines because 
the company operates mostly in project teams with various support staff assisting the 
overall structure. Through cross-functional teams, members from various functions are 
constantly interacting. Engineering, design, and technical solutions personnel are 
coordinating with government relations and social impact specialists. Within this 
structure there are temporary teams assigned for special projects. There are horizontal 
linkages and collaborations happening within teams across a wide variety of functional 
areas and across the different teams in the company due to the unique environment that 
101 Ibid. 
102 $65.83 billion in 2014, from Google annual income statement, marketwatch.com, accessed 
October 14, 2015, http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/goog/financials. 
103 Steve Levy, In the Plex (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011), 129. 
104“Financial Reporting and Headcount,” accessed October 14, 2015, 
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Google establishes. These mutual adjustments, as described by Mintzberg, are one of the 
defining features of the Adhocracy.107 
Anika Steiber provides insight into Google’s organizational structure in her book 
on the company’s ability to innovate. “Companies that operate in rapidly changing 
environments need to continuously and proactively change their organization.”108 
Google’s fluid nature and structural flexibility allow teams to form and interact as 
needed. There is no need for a complex mapping of linkages when describing the 
company because the very strength of the organization is the lack of defined links. If a 
product team recognizes the need to collaborate closely with a social impact specialist 
(vertical, horizontal or diagonal link), they can integrate that specialist into the project 
team. 
This conceptual structure may give the impression that Google operates through 
chaotic disorganization. However, this assumption ignores the effectiveness of the 
company’s technical expertise. A high level of professionalism is evident through 
engineering and maintenance accomplishments that exceed other companies in the field. 
The exceptionality of Google in this area is not that it ignores the need for organization; it 
is that teams self-adjust and rapidly change the organization as necessary. 
As an organization, Google continues to be a model for success in the fast paced 
tech world. Its structure, however, is only one small part of what makes it efficient in the 
unstable, complex environment. The structural concepts are effective within this model 
because of its organizational culture. 
Maintaining the culture and atmosphere of Google is extremely important to its 
founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin. The bright colors, recreation facilities, lounges, 
and cafes all have distinct purposes and are critical to the way Google does business.  
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At Google, the office culture and atmosphere are a physical manifestation of the 
organizational design elements of an adhocracy.109 The “Plex” was designed to have a 
“campus like” feel. The compact workspaces force Google employees to collaborate. The 
cafes and recreational areas are designed to reduce the impediments to work and force 
creative interactions by keeping the employees at work and bringing them together in 
community areas. This design brings personnel from different project teams together to 
interact where they would not have normally had interaction in a different work 
environment. Google’s AdSense product, a multi-billion dollar business, was created by a 
group of engineers from different design teams that were hanging out playing pool in one 
of Google’s many lounge areas.110  
In the high technology world, companies self-innovate to increase internal 
collaboration. Industry leaders recognized that they had no way to maintain their 
companies without constant innovation.111 Innovative companies like Google put serious 
thought into how to increase interaction among employees beyond structural adaptations. 
One proven technique is the on-site free cafeterias that keep employees on campus and 
constantly communicating, even eavesdropping on other group’s ideas. The cafeteria and 
lounge areas are known for being the locations in which many great ideas were formed. 
Google spends 80 million dollars per year on food for its employees.112 
When Google relocated to their current campus, they applied specific design 
elements to increase human density. The previous owners of the structure, Silicon 
Graphics Inc., had only 950 employees. Google placed over 2,500 workers in the same 
space, overcrowding work areas to increase interaction. These areas were also kept open 
and unobstructed by the partitions ubiquitous throughout corporate America. This open 
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space allows conversations to be accidentally overheard thus creating passive 
collaboration.113  
Another aspect of Google’s internal integration is the weekly Friday afternoon 
meeting nicknamed “TGIF,” initially started as an informal gathering to spread news and 
introduce new employees. TGIF is now video teleconferenced to all Google locations 
which demo new programs, initiatives, and most importantly, allow a “no holds barred Q 
and A” session with the founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin. Ideas generated 
throughout Google are shared with fellow employees from Asia to Silicon Valley and 
project teams receive input as a result.114 Employees are expected to ask tough questions 
if they do not understand the direction a project is moving or disagree with new policy.115 
This type of behavior that questions authority and seeks truth is a cornerstone of Google’s 
internal process and is rooted in the personalities of the founders. It not only serves to 
inculcate a culture of open communication, but also encourages interaction between 
various echelons of management and employees. 
The underlying values and beliefs of Google can be traced back to the personality 
and experiences of founders. Larry and Sergey were both “Montessori” kids. At 
Montessori school Larry and Sergey learned to do things because they made sense, not 
because an authority figure told them to do it. This experience made them natural 
problem-solvers, independent thinkers, and programmed to challenge authority.116 
Another aspect of the underlying values can be attributed to the way Google started in the 
garage of a colleague’s house in a residential neighborhood. At their original location in 
Menlo Park they became accustomed to the amenities and conveniences of working from 
a residence. Having a shower and kitchen in the immediate vicinity helped the Google’s 
founders realize the benefits of removing as many of the impediments to work as 
possible. Google removes impediments to work in other ways as well. In order to 
minimize the disruption of expense processing, Google set up a corporate “G-Card” that 
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streamlined the system and automated the work.117 “Essentially, Google has eliminated a 
potential hundreds of thousands of downtime hours that employees would otherwise 
spend on housekeeping errands [sic].”118  
Another characteristic of Google culture stems from the core beliefs of the 
founders. The mission of Google, “to organize the world’s information and make it 
universally accessible and useful,”119 reflects the normative values of Larry and Sergey. 
Google’s mission and culture are deliberate and thoroughly considered by the founders 
themselves and contrasts sharply with the practices of some large companies where the 
mission statements and company vision-documents are filled with corporate jargon and 
cliché, created by human resources personnel, signed by the CEO and distributed.120 
Larry and Sergey want their mission and beliefs to guide their employees’ focus and 
factor in decision making. The founders of Google understand the importance of having 
clearly articulated mission and goals, and allowing their employees the room to 
accomplish that mission. Google’s policies and strategy are focused on anticipating and 
managing the change in the external environment and they must be highly adaptive to a 
consistently changing technology environment. Conversely, the bureaucratic culture 
focuses on internal processes and efficiency. External alignment rewards innovation and 
creates change.  
Organizations are influenced by a variety of external stakeholders.121 Google’s 
external stakeholders are its users. Google’s approach to the external environment is 
displayed by their “Ten Truths.”122 Their external focus exemplifies what Daft calls a 
“strong adaptive culture.”123 The management of their strong adaptive culture is the main 
way they attract new talent. This can be seen through Google’s hiring practices. Google 
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places a strong emphasis on the measurable scores of academia when vetting employees. 
They run their interview process much like a Ph. D. defense,124 and value talent over 
experience. This focus on creating an intellectually charged atmosphere, “where the kind 
of people we wanted to work here would work here for free,”125 has helped Google 
remain outwardly focused and an industry leader, with a distinct a culture. Consistent 
with Google’s progressive cultural adjustments are the ways in which they incentivize 
their employees.  
Talent management and incentives are as important to Google as the structure and 
culture. The selection and development of high potential junior executives is a central 
element to continuous success in the industry. Google uses the Associate Product 
Manager Program (APM) to inculcate a culture of innovation and understanding among 
those that have a bright future within the company. Levy points out one particular APM 
trip in which the future leaders of the company traveled to more than a dozen cities across 
the world. They were exposed to Asian tech markets and remote third world villages. The 
trip did not force ideas upon the group, but facilitated their self-improvement through 
exposure. The author describes this inculcation process as making APMs “more 
Googley.”126  
The 70/20/10 policy instituted by Google has clear ties to the underlying values of 
the company. Under this rule, the engineers would spend 70% of their time on assigned 
projects, 20% on projects of their choosing within their area of expertise, and 10% on 
“wild card” projects that could be anything that interested them.127 This system helps 
Google maintain a creative edge, stay true to its beliefs, and provide intrinsic motivation 
for its top talent.  
Google places extraordinary value on establishing an organizational culture that 
supports the competitive advantages of innovation and adaptability. The incentive 
structure driving this culture is aligned with the expectancy theory model. First, Google 
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recognizes the centrality of hiring people with valence128 in line with the culture, phrased 
simply as “getting hiring right.”129 For Google, this means intentionally and persistently 
hiring people who are highly intelligent and potentially smarter than the manager or the 
person conducting the interview.130 This includes hiring heavily from the academic 
community, a population that tends to be smart and well vetted through tenure and peer 
review, thereby reducing the risk of inadvertently hiring someone less intelligent or a 
poor performer.131  
The predominant trait sought by Google is a growth mindset, described in How 
Google Works, of being a learner. The valence of a typical learner nests neatly within 
Google’s culture. Learners tend to be self-motivated to improve and drive themselves; 
they need room for self-improvement, and value the process of competition and the 
resulting comradery. Additionally, learners tend to more easily admit mistakes, and view 
failure as a natural part of the self-improvement process. The combination of vetted 
intelligence and self-motivation provides the ideal hire for Google, in the form of “Smart 
Creatives.”132 This self-propelled drive toward excellence in its employees gives Google 
the freedom to establish a culture that focuses on removing barriers to communication. It 
provides great freedom to innovate, and stays away from unnecessarily restrictive rules 
and work standardization.  
To provide initial incentives for “smart creatives” to join their ranks, Google uses 
the herd effect to their benefit.133 By placing great emphasis on the importance of getting 
hiring right, Google ensures that the “smart creatives” hire more smart creatives. The 
perpetuation of a high bar to entry becomes a recruiting tool in itself.  
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Intrinsic rewards are a powerful tool to motivate people toward effort and 
performance, but are not complete by themselves (few people actually work for free). 
Monetary rewards to ensure instrumentality are utilized by Google to shape and reinforce 
the culture through further incentivizing high performance. Google chooses to use 
disproportionate rewards in their pay structure to motivate and retain key employees. The 
idea that “exceptional people get exceptional pay” bucks the long-standing trends in 
corporate culture that rewards go to those close to the top (CEO salaries) and close to the 
transactions (investment bankers, salespeople). Instead, big rewards are given to the 
people closest to great products and innovations.134 Google strives to avoid egalitarian 
pay, where people making vastly different contributions are paid about the same. 
The ongoing desire to perform is maintained by ensuring that these smart and 
creative employees are kept interested. One way this is accomplished is by preventing 
people from becoming too comfortable or settled in one particular role. High performing 
employees are moved between key developmental jobs periodically as they progress 
through the company, ensuring they are developed into well-rounded professionals and 
ensuring a state of constant learning.135 As a force of market demand for their employees, 
top performers and smart creatives are frequently drawn toward other opportunities. In 
response, Google has chosen to make retention of top employees a financial priority, and 
they have chosen to “move mountains to retain valued leaders, stars and innovators.”136 
Google’s incentive structure acts as a self-feeding system, mirroring the 
Expectancy model. The company is built on the backs of “smart creatives” and learners, 
driven explorers with a high tolerance of failure with tendencies toward comradery and 
high performance. These top performers are incentivized by rewards for adding value to 
the company, and retained through initiatives to keep the work interesting. This 
combination results in exceptional individual effort, which combined with the inherent 
ability of the personnel, and backed by the resources of a multi-billion dollar company, to 
                                                 
134 Ibid., 126–128. 
135 Schmidt, Google, 127. 
136 Ibid., 129–131. 
 38
performance above and beyond other industry leaders. This performance feeds back into 
the valence and instrumentality that define the baseline for Google’s performance.  
Google considers the environment and its connection to a culture of innovation to 
be essential.137 While the dorm room mentality may be difficult to transplant into military 
culture, there are aspects that can be transferred to any organization that requires a shift to 
more innovative practices. 
1. Conclusions 
 Specific aspects of infrastructure design, physical environment and 
culture, and reduction of the impediments to work force collaboration and 
knowledge sharing promote innovation 
 Organic, ad-hoc, cross-functional project teams facilitate the required 
flexibility and adaptability to succeed in an unstable and complex 
environment.  
 Clearly understood priorities and organizational philosophy, and a culture 
of open communication between echelons of the organization, stimulate 
initiative and permit ideas to grow.  
 A strong emphasis on hiring talented personnel and rewarding those with 
great and innovative ideas provide motivation and incentive to attract top 
performers.  
C. JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 
 The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is an operational subordinate 
command of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and was established in 
1980. Formed in response to the institutional failures of Operation EAGLE CLAW in 
Iran, JSOC members have been active in each of our nation’s conflicts since its inception. 
According to SOCOM, JSOC is “charged to study special operations requirements and 
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techniques, ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct 
special operations exercises and training, and develop joint special operations tactics.”138 
General (Ret.) Stanley McChrystal commanded JSOC from 2003 to 2006. Upon 
taking command, General McChrystal realized that his command was facing an enemy 
that was arrayed as a loose network, loosely structured and highly adaptive, but capable 
of great operational breadth and agility.139 During his time at JSOC, he enacted 
fundamental organizational design and cultural changes in response to the complex 
environment that the command faced in its surgical strike operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In his work Team of Teams and supporting lectures, McChrystal lays out 
ideas on increasing organizational effectiveness, drawn from his personnel experience 
and additional research. The central idea of the book is the interaction of organizations 
with complexity. McChrystal uses Edward Lorenz’s definition of complexity, described 
as “…a diverse array of connected elements that interact frequently.”140 As the density of 
these interactions increases, even small numbers of elements in a network can quickly 
prevent prediction.141 This definition resembles that of Mintzberg, as it relates frequent 
interactions and constant change.  
General (Ret.) McChrystal discusses three key themes concerning organizational 
effectiveness in the face of complexity. First, he explains that the inflexible and 
bureaucratic measures of efficiency that JSOC employed were insufficient in the face of 
the complexity of the operational environment in Iraq during Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM. Second, he explains the importance of institutionalizing shared 
consciousness, and the effects of connecting his organization to itself and an exterior 
network of partners. Lastly, he argues that decentralization of decision-making in JSOC 
enabled greater organizational flexibility.  
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McChrystal notes that the focus of management has long been improvements to 
organizational efficiency.142 The result of this quest for efficiency was hierarchical 
divisional and bureaucratic organizational structures, which were well utilized by 
businesses and militaries alike.143 Upon initiation of operations in Iraq, the rigid hierarchy 
that defines military bureaucracy was a reality in JSOC, despite its stature as an elite 
special operations entity. When faced with a newly complex and volatile operational 
environment, JSOC increased its internal efficiency in conducting core tasks. However, 
this response was ineffective due to the organization’s lack of flexibility and adaptability. 
The classic military bureaucratic structure stifled both the necessary speed of execution 
and adaptability to react in pace with changes in the environment. JSOC had assumed 
that the organization “had adequate time for information to flow through those [existing 
organizational] pathways.”144  
Rather than continuing to simply react, JSOC realized that it needed to increase its 
ability to execute a larger variety of tasks at a speed that matched the environment.145 
JSOC had to let go of its previous emphasis on doing things “the right way” and start 
doing “the right things,”146 as measures of efficiency and task competency are valuable 
but do not predict successful outcomes.147  
 The first step toward adapting to the complexity of the operational environment 
in Iraq was to establish a shared consciousness. McChrystal argues that this shared 
consciousness creates idea flow that builds the collective intelligence of an organization. 
This idea flow is based upon two determinants. The first is “engagement,” or active 
participation within a small group or team, followed by “exploration,” or frequent contact 
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with other entities within, and exterior to the organization.148 To attain this idea flow, the 
organization needed to connect with its partners and within itself.  
To increase idea flow, General McChrystal instituted a video teleconference 
(VTC) that included all entities within the command. This VTC forced information flow 
to leaders, units and staffs alike, creating a venue to establish a common operational 
picture, share best practices, and ensure people within the organization knew what others 
were doing. This VTC created a level of personal buy-in and further opened linkages 
within the organization to allow for collaboration and continuous innovation.149  
JSOC’s efforts to match the environment included building a network wherein 
people from disparate ends of the organization were linked to each other, toward the goal 
of having someone in every office know someone in all the others.150 This linkage is 
critical, as McChrystal notes, because these links create the emotional bonds that drive 
people,151 and allows large and diverse organizations to reap the benefits of loyalty and 
connectivity that small teams enjoy.152 To create the linkages, JSOC strove to dissolve 
the barriers and “silos” that existed between each element of the command.153 JSOC 
initiated an “embedded exposure” exchange program between operational personnel from 
different subordinate units.154 The program became empowering as operators and other 
personnel spent time with other units within JSOC to build personal relationships and 
develop mutual understanding.155 This program created relationships between people in 
disparate units. These personal bonds served to reduce institutional barriers to 
communication and created linkages supporting exploration and idea flow.  
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To amplify the effects of internal collaboration, JSOC increased its external links. 
The organization increased these linkages through the addition of a large number of 
liaison officers (LNOs). They put some of their best officers and NCOs in embassies, 
interagency organizations, and adjacent military headquarters. While other units typically 
sent less capable leaders to fill liaison slots, JSOC provided highly talented individuals, 
proving to the outside organization that collaboration was a top priority.156  
Another effort to flatten the organization was, “the creation of the NSA-created 
linkup called the Real Time Regional Gateway, which allowed operatives who seized 
scraps of intelligence from raids to send their crucial data to different nodes across the 
network.”157 “One analyst might not appreciate the significance of a given piece of intel. 
But once JSOC effectively became an experiment in intel crowdsourcing, it soon got a 
bigger, deeper picture of the enemy it was fighting and essentially emulating.”158 JSOC’s 
ability to implement structural changes to adapt with the changing environment 
demonstrated the organic flexibility required of an innovative organization operating in a 
complex environment.   
A large factor to JSOCs transformation was the effort to decentralize authorities, 
information, and responsibility. General McChrystal stands on firm footing in his 
assessment that decentralization of decision-making provides greater institutional 
flexibility. He states that he and other leaders in his command empowered the “doers to 
think.”159 McChrystal realized that, “the seemingly instantaneous communications 
available up and down the hierarchy had slowed rather than accelerated decision 
making.”160 Because information was readily available to commanders at the higher 
echelons, the commanders retained authority over certain combat actions. Even when 
faced with these types of command decisions, because of the sheer volume of 
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information, McChrystal found himself comparatively less informed and generally 
relying on the advice of the officers that had brought the decision to him.161 He realized 
that the time required, minutes in some cases, to seek command approval was not 
resulting in better, more informed decisions but potentially preventing the task force from 
executing a successful operation.162 In response, McChrystal communicated his thoughts 
to his subordinates and then delegated the command authority for certain actions to them.  
General McChrystal advocates that senior leaders facing complexity should strive 
to be gardeners, rather than chess masters. “Chess masters,” he explains, are the classic 
heroic leaders that the military has long strived to produce, “the courageous and all-
knowing puppet master.”163 In today’s world of mass information and instant 
communication, the human mind is easily overwhelmed and a centralized leadership can 
quickly become a hindrance.164 In contrast, McChrystal presents the idea of the gardener. 
The gardener uses decentralization to free the mind to think in broad terms about the 
strategic direction of the organization, while tirelessly creating and maintaining the 
organizational “ecosystem” where idea flow and decentralization are constantly 
reinforced. The two decisive elements of the gardener’s leadership are clearly 
communicating priorities, with clearly articulated actions in concert with the priorities.165 
This leadership through personal transparency in alignment with organizational priorities 
is, as McChrystal states, “the new ideal.”166 
This focus on the creation of an ecosystem that aligns with organizational goals 
has several effects on an organization. First, it provides subordinate leaders and staffs 
greater buy-in to the decision-making process, which improves productivity and often the 
quality of the decision. This ability to make decisions and be evaluated on their quality 
and outcome provides a positive correlation between efforts and tangible rewards for 
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favorable performance. In this case, the tangible rewards are the favorable evaluations 
that enable members to compete for the best jobs in the future, and the intrinsic reward of 
working somewhere within the military that truly rewards initiative and collaboration.  
The second effect of decentralization is that it frees senior leaders to spend less 
time making decisions that can ultimately be handled effectively below them. This time 
and energy now becomes available to think in broad terms about organizational issues 
and strategic direction.167 This is positive for subordinate leaders and staffs in two ways. 
First, if the senior leaders spend their time creating and maintaining an ecosystem that is 
decentralized and collaborative, the work environment is more rewarding for 
subordinates. Second, the senior leaders’ time spent tending the strategic needs of the 
organization is time not spent micromanaging the decisions of subordinate leaders. 
Similar to Google, the fast-paced and decentralized environment attracts individuals who 
desire autonomy in their work. 
At all levels of JSOC, hiring requires an assessment and selection.168 This is a 
departure from the remainder of commands within the military. Other special operations 
commands require assessment and selection for operators and key supporters, but none 
require all staff and support personnel to be vetted prior to assignment. For operators, this 
includes the military’s most physically demanding selection process. For staff officers 
and support personnel, this process is less strenuous, but present nonetheless. In the 
military environment, the mere presence of a viable selection process for staff and 
support attracts people interested in working with higher caliber individuals. In concert 
with Google, a high bar to entry becomes a recruiting tool.  
JSOC effectively recognized the disparity between their organizational design and 
the operational environment that was preventing the task force from realizing results in 
Iraq. With decentralized decision making, increased linkages, and shared consciousness, 
JSOC transformed itself into an organization capable of innovation and able to adapt to 
the challenges of complexity. 
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1. Conclusions 
 Increased idea flow throughout the organization can be achieved by 
creating external linkages to resources, ideas, and end users, and by 
establishing internal linkages across subordinate entities. 
 Leaders should clearly articulate mission and priorities and tirelessly 
maintain an ecosystem that gives subordinates the autonomy and resources 
to succeed  
 Autonomy and a high bar to entry allow initiative and attracts talent 
D. SILICON VALLEY 
Silicon Valley is a geographic area known for innovation in high technology 
industries. The region includes highly profitable companies such as Hewlett Packard in 
Palo Alto, Google in Mountain View, and Uber in San Francisco. Equally important are 
the countless “garage start-ups” in which small groups of technology-savvy entrepreneurs 
attempt to develop innovative concepts into billion dollar corporations. Top universities, 
including Stanford University and the University of California- Berkeley, also play a 
major role in the region. All these entities interact in a way that has resulted in some of 
the most groundbreaking technological developments of the information age. The 
purpose of analyzing Silicon Valley is not to understand why individual organizations 
within the valley are successful but to understand why the region has such a high 
concentration of businesses that can rapidly innovate. 
Silicon Valley emerged organically as the world leader in high technology 
development when it surpassed the Route 128 region of Massachusetts. A major 
difference between Silicon Valley and the previous United States technology 
development center is the fact that companies in the valley recognized that the 
technology world is not a zero sum game. In the Route 128 region, large corporations 
utilized traditional, industrial age, isolated research and development and an offensive 
strategy to corner markets. “In Silicon Valley, ‘collaboration’ is defined as something 
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you do with another colleague or company that achieves greatness.”169 Silicon Valley 
companies recognize that technology develops so quickly and opens up so many new 
markets that there is little need to try to push out all the competition. This recognition 
improves collaboration and overall productivity within an industry. Companies spend less 
time fighting competitors and more time being complementary to overall system 
development. Silicon Valley companies will often go to similar companies to borrow 
components and provide each other with business. The prevailing thought centers on 
forward progress of their own organizations, rather than with pushing out competition.170 
In Silicon Valley “the flow of ideas, startup creation, and partnering activities produced 
value for the companies and individuals involved, and also for the regions as a whole.”171  
Many organizations in Silicon Valley recognize the importance of increasing the 
rate of technology improvement in a particular field. For example, Elon Musk decided to 
share critical patents used to produce the groundbreaking Tesla electric cars, similar to 
Adner’s information collaboration concept in The Wide Lens. He explained to Harvard 
Business Review that “other companies making electric cars, and the world would all 
benefit from a common, rapidly-evolving technology platform.” The more Tesla’s 
competitors develop their own electric cars, the more ubiquitous charging stations will 
become and the more people will be willing to buy one of the most advanced electric cars 
in the world.172 Many of the organizations in the region now have a vested interest in 
progress being made in battery technology. This progress is made through information 
sharing and increased interaction between organizations.  
Interdependent industries facilitate innovations in reaching the market and 
developing ideas. The region is resilient because of the ties among organizations, not 
reliance on the strength of any particular node. If one area of the industry fails, or 
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becomes obsolete, ties are adjusted in order to compensate. In contrast, one large node 
that attempts to accomplish all tasks by itself does not easily adjust to change. For 
example, the tech companies of the Massachusetts Route 128 region of Massachusetts 
fell behind the level of progress that Silicon Valley was able to maintain because they 
relied on large, self-sufficient models.173 
As the preeminent region for technology innovation, San Jose, California area 
attracts brilliant minds and participates in a system with an unprecedented “velocity of 
information.”174 It is common for employees in the tech industry to move from job to job 
every few years, bringing their ideas and connections along with them and capitalizing on 
extensive personal networks. From the competitive CEOs to the youngest software 
engineers, this community is continuously communicating and building off of each 
other’s ideas.175 Advanced communication technology and a connected community 
support this flow of information despite intense competition among certain corporations. 
Companies have learned that embracing openness and acceptance of fluid environments 
are beneficial when designing an organization geared towards innovation.176 
A network with a functional need to transfer complex knowledge must have 
strong ties between nodes that are constantly kept aware of each other’s knowledge. In 
order to satisfy the need for external information there must be diverse external ties.177 
Silicon Valley meets these requirements through the underlying social network. Whereas 
traditional, hierarchical organizations are defined by strong pensions and stable careers, 
Silicon Valley employees rarely stay with a single company for long. The need to move 
based on changing markets and opportunities for innovation are a primary motivator for 
employees.178  
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Silicon Valley is an open network with diverse nodes that reach beyond the San 
Francisco Bay area. Thirty-six percent of the region’s population is foreign-born.179 With 
this influx of immigrants comes foreign ideas that contribute to the wide range of 
innovative capabilities. The social networks that exist throughout Silicon Valley are 
subsequently extended to other technology centers such as Tel Aviv, Beijing, and 
Bangalore.180 International technology specialists spend years in Silicon Valley and then 
return to their own countries armed with valuable social capital.181 They then create 
nodes and ties that can be integrated as clusters into the network. The more people from 
Beijing travel to Silicon Valley for temporary work, the greater the density between the 
regional clusters. Their travel throughout the world only improves the social capital of all 
those that stay in contact with Silicon Valley. 
Inexperience can be an advantage; innovative approaches are often developed by 
those new to a field. Garage startups generate many disruptive innovations because “they 
are not tied to any specific customer base, product design biases, or even business model 
frameworks.”182 Therefore, by interacting and communicating problem sets to those not 
directly related to the field, the likelihood of innovation increases.183 In any field that 
involves great uncertainty, people will attempt to simplify a situation by relying on what 
they know from past experience.184 Extensive experience and success propagates biases 
that lock professionals into previously learned expectations.185  
Dominant organizations within the region become highly popular and increase 
their capacity to expand their network. “Popular hubs tend to grow more connections 
(think of eBay and Amazon). Thus, hubs that serve as the sticky ground points of a 
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network continue to attract more hubs.”186 A company like Amazon therefore increases 
their ability to work with other innovators and share ideas. Despite becoming large and 
unwieldy to manage in a flat structure, external factors enable innovation while internal 
factors limit it. 
The Skolkovo innovation center, was initiated by former Russian president 
Demetri Medvedev in 2010.187 It was designed to be a Russian version of Silicon Valley. 
However, it is has yet to achieve any significant innovative output. Exploring the 
characteristics of this unsuccessful innovation center illuminates the successful 
characteristics of Silicon Valley. 
Former Russian President Demetri Medvedev established the Skolkovo 
Innovation Center with a large supporting budget. President Putin and the Duma have 
provided further support. “The project will receive a total of 135.6 billion rubles ($4.1 
billion) from the state budget by 2020.”188 Despite paying millions of dollars to bring in 
Silicon Valley veterans and foreign organizations, including a close partnership with 
MIT, Skolkovo is not making progress towards emulating the Silicon Valley network 
environment.189  
Russia’s innovation center continues to stumble despite massive financial 
investment. This results from deeply bureaucratic regulation and paranoia concerning the 
theft of developing technologies. In 2012, Vladimir Putin’s new treason laws further 
threatened the ability to collaborate with the wider technology community. The law states 
that “citizens recruited by international organizations acting against the country’s 
interests will also be considered traitors.”190 These types of laws, intentionally written 
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with ambiguity, allow Putin to legally attack those who are suspected of working against 
Russian progress.191 This inhibits collaboration and networking with foreign technology 
leaders. At the micro level, intellectual property laws are so inadequate and theft is so 
common that collaborating on projects is more likely to profit a third party than provide 
collective benefit.192 The cost of networking and collaboration is significantly higher in 
Russia. Whereas Silicon Valley is a melting pot that attracts minds and money from all 
over the world, Skolkovo is isolated by a hostile government and international 
sanctions.193 
In Russia, there is significantly less incentive to innovate than in western nations. 
“Throughout history, Russia has never adequately rewarded or protected its most 
innovative citizens.”194 Despite major inventions since Tsarist times, few were taken to 
the conclusion of becoming innovation.195 The lack of applicable patent laws has reduced 
innovation since Yablochkov’s invention of an electric street lamp. His invention was 
unwanted in Russia, so he went to Paris and turned it into the “city of lights.”196 There 
was no profit for him in Russia and no incentive for anyone to financially back his work. 
In Soviet times, the idea of taking an invention and using it for profit was offensive to 
scientists. Entrepreneurship was viewed by Soviet society as the bourgeoisie attempting 
to take advantage of workers.197 Significant advances in laser technology never amounted 
to anything applicable in Russia but entrepreneurs in the western world used this 
technology to revolutionize several fields of science.198  
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Today, Russia still struggles with innovation and cannot provide the appropriate 
incentives to innovators. The patent system fails to offer the legal protection necessary to 
facilitate monetary rewards for innovation. During Soviet times, all inventions were the 
property for the state. Russia never even had patent laws until 1992 and since that time 
they have been inadequate by western standards. Other corporations, and even the 
government, can steal an idea for their own profit, leaving the innovator without any 
reward.199 Investment in anything other than energy and resource extraction is rare in 
Russia. Venture capitalism is not the great search for innovation that it is in the United 
States and it is extremely rare for an oligarch to put money into a third party’s research 
and development.200 
According to MIT’s Russian business professor, Loren Graham, “Technology 
doesn’t take off by itself. It has to have all kinds of supporting ingredients.” The social, 
legal, political and economic factors necessary for technology to be utilized in business 
do not exist for Skolkovo.201 
There is no pool of venture capitalist investors seeking to take risks with new 
technology in order to develop a start-up company. Russian wealth is based on 
oligarchical energy billionaires that have little desire to invest in these technologies. 
Additionally, the legal system is insufficient for protecting intellectual property. Russian 
businesses can easily steal technology from competitors. This makes IT investment much 
riskier than in the United States. Russia’s political actions continue to push foreign 
investors away. Whereas Silicon Valley is a melting pot that attracts minds and money 
from all over the world, Skolkovo is isolated by a hostile government and international 
sanctions. The Skolkovo network is limited by its environment. These limitations create 
tight boundaries which exclude the necessary nodes to make an effective network.202  
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1. Conclusions 
 Organizations use mutually beneficial collaboration to create value rather 
than focus on zero sum gains 
 Open networks and diverse external ties drive fresh ideas 
 Innovation and collaboration must be incentivized and enabled through 
environmental conditions  
E. INNOVATION OUTSIDE OF THE MILITARY AND INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 
Organizations seeking to become more innovative and adaptive are not isolated to 
the military and technology industries. The following companies of the manufacturing, 
design, food, and beverage industries have utilized organizational design principles, 
structural and procedural, to increase innovation, and ensure relevant products are 
reaching their end users. W.L Gore and Associates, IDEO, Stone Brewing Company, and 
Chipotle Mexican Grill’s respective operational practices toward innovation differ; 
however, all are industry leaders competing in complex markets where relationships with 
their customers are critical to success.  
W.L Gore and Associates, Inc is an innovative, privately-held technology and 
manufacturing firm. “Gore focuses its efforts in four main areas: electronics, fabrics, 
industrial and medical products.”203 Its notable products include Gore-Tex fabric, fiber 
optic cables and assemblies, and medical technology. Recent revenues are approximately 
$3 billion.204  
Founder Bill Gore started his career as an electrical engineer at DuPont, and 
started his namesake enterprise from the basement of the family home in 1958.205 
Needless to say, Bill Gore’s startup was a success, as Gore is a top manufacturing and 
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technology innovator, and is consistently ranked among the top firms to work for, both 
domestically and abroad.206  
Bill Gore had a knack for organizational design, and asked questions while 
striving to create an organization “…with no hierarchy- where everyone was free to talk 
with everyone else? Could you let people choose what they wanted to work on, rather 
than assigning them tasks?. . . where people would put as much energy into finding the 
next big thing as they did into milking the last big thing?”207 Gore’s answer to these 
questions was at first glance a divisional structure, based around its core products of 
fabrics, electronics, medical products and industrial products.208 However, underneath the 
surface was a functioning and deliberately shaped flat lattice organization of cross-
functional teams and informal networks. This lattice structure is characterized by a lack 
of hierarchy of communication, and the absence of traditional organizational charts. 
Communication and collaboration are critical, but occur through the company’s network 
of personal relationships.209 Similar to Google and IDEO, physical locations were kept 
intentionally small to promote community and personal buy-in.210 Gore was driven by his 
experience working on small teams at DuPont, characterized by initiative, courage, and 
operational autonomy.211 The lattice concept of cross functional teams, combined with 
rigorously informal and flat communication ensures that Gore retains the advantages of 
the small team while continuing to grow. The tempting efficiency and predictability of a 
rigid organizational structure is cast aside in favor of a people-based organic structure 
that is adaptable, and encourages innovation.  
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Associates at Gore are incentivized by an environment shaped by four simple 
principles, driven by the premise that associates “will exceed expectations when given 
the freedom to do so.”212 The first is freedom, “where action is prized…and mistakes are 
viewed as part of the creative process.”213 Each associate is expected to act on their own 
initiative, and failure serves to inform the organization of best practices and fresh 
direction. Fairness to each other, suppliers, and customers is expected; this fairness 
creates an environment that is stable and pleasant during risk-taking endeavors. Next is 
commitment, where associates are not assigned tasks, but instead make their own 
commitments. These commitments are not forced or delegated, but are binding when 
undertaken. This autonomy ensures that people gravitate toward projects that are 
interesting and rewarding, and providing near-maximum buy in. Finally, the waterline 
principle is described central to risk mitigation. The water line principle is described as 
“everyone at Gore consults with other associates before taking actions that might be 
below the waterline- causing serious damage to the company.” 214 
This “extreme freedom” is sustained only through strenuous hiring procedures 
focused on finding individuals who are initiative-based communicators that freely 
collaborate and need little outside motivation. Peers evaluate results and leadership is 
earned over time. At Gore, compensation is based on contribution to project teams and 
rank ordered by a combination of leaders and peers, with rewards emphasizing stock 
options and profit sharing. These principles succeed in making Gore fiercely 
decentralized, constantly collaborative, and incentivized to work hard on projects that are 
interesting and good for the organization. 
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This balance of people-first organizational design and risk mitigation reflect in 
CEO Terri Kelly’s words, “I spend a significant amount of time focusing on the 
environment at Gore. I’m a firm believer that if you get the environment right, the 
business stuff is easy.”215 Furthermore, “The belief at Gore was that it was tough to plan 
for innovation, but it was possible to organize for it.”216  
Gore is a unique case of laser-like focus on creating and maintaining an 
organization dedicated to the principle that the right people, given the proper amount of 
freedom and expectations are capable of continually innovating. 
Since its inception in 1991, IDEO has been providing innovative solutions and 
turnkey products for a wide range of businesses. David Kelley originally started the 
design consulting firm in 1978 after his disappointing experiences working as an engineer 
at several large corporations.217 The firm began to grow after several successful projects 
which were largely a product of creativity, flexibility, and the firms’ proximity to the 
emerging tech industry of Silicon Valley.218 The industry leading design firm, is wildly 
successful in uncertain environments largely because of their project team structure.  
IDEO’s organizational structure exemplifies what Mintzberg describes as the 
required fit for the highly complex, unstable environments of the technology industry. 
IDEO “fuses experts drawn from different specialties into smoothly functioning creative 
teams,”219 to solve design problems for its clients. IDEO uses a networked approach to 
problem solving. IDEO’s founder David Kelley emphasizes that when he is stuck with a 
difficult problem that he seeks help from the smart people around him.220 At IDEO, the 
problem-solvers are linked with the heads of corporations who need solutions, unlike the 
more traditional hierarchical organizations that Kelley had worked for where the 
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engineers or problem solvers were kept behind the scenes apart from the big machine.221 
The problem solvers must also be the researchers, they need to immerse themselves into 
the situation where the problem exists to conduct hands-on organic research.222 Once 
their teams brainstorm potential solutions, they test and modify their prototypes 
extensively in a “safe” environment where failure is accepted and expected.  
IDEO utilizes similar environmental characteristics as Google’s, campus-like feel 
where open spaces and flow patterns are designed to increase employee interaction.223 
Similar to McChrytstal’s assertions about “gardeners”224 IDEO believes that innovation 
flourishes in a carefully constructed environment where the proper components will 
foster the growth of new ideas.225 In addition to their efforts to “alter space to support 
innovation,”226 IDEO’s strength is their ability to assemble the “right” teams to solve 
problems. They understand the strength of a team, compared to an individual when 
seeking innovative solutions. General Manager Thomas Kelley demonstrated this 
assertion when describing the work of Thomas Edison, “Even the most legendary 
individual inventor is often a team in disguise.”227 Kelley discusses how in several years 
Edison generated over four hundred patents included those for, “the telegraph, telephone, 
phonograph, and light bulb; with the assistance of a fourteen man team.”228  
IDEO believes innovative teams must be ruthlessly mission-oriented and faced 
with a deadline, non-hierarchical, diverse and well-rounded, work in the proper 
environment where negative consequences of failure and limitations are removed.229 
IDEO, achieves success through small teams of diverse individuals. An effective IDEO 
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“hot team” is “well rounded and respectful of its diversity.”230 The company recognizes 
that many of its most innovative groups contain peculiar members who do not seem to fit 
into the larger group. Eccentric thinkers and introverted book worms are often the key to 
bringing fresh perspectives and igniting the innovation process with an unexpected 
approach.231 There must be significant differences in perception in order to avoid biases 
and promote original discussion.  
IDEO has been successfully designing products for clients from diverse industries 
for almost 25 years because of their flat, organic, and adaptable team concept. Attention 
to the needs of their customers, accepting failure as learning, and collaboration has 
helped them stay the design industry leader.  
Understanding the market or needs of an end user can be the motivational forces 
required to cause a disruptive innovation. In game theory, when an actor is faced with a 
situation in which a favorable outcome is unlikely in a given situation, they may seek to 
“change the game.”232 Two companies in the food and beverage industry have caused 
major disruptions by avoiding industry standard vertical mechanistic processes and 
becoming more horizontal with their innovative approaches: Stone Brewing Company 
and Chipotle Mexican Grill.  
The U.S. beer industry is composed of three tiers: the brewer, the distributor, and 
the retailer. Breweries, whether small or large, are reliant on the independent distribution 
system to get their products on retailers’ shelves. Independent distributors allow small 
breweries better access to markets because of the prohibitive costs of building a 
standalone distribution network.233 However, because of the costs to the distributors for 
lesser performing products, and the increased competition for distributor space, the 
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distributors tend to dictate what products will go to retail.234 This limits some products 
that smaller craft breweries produce from reaching a retailer, even if the product has a 
popular following. If a beer does not compete in volume sales with distributors’ other 
brands, it may not make it to shelves. These smaller brewers must then accept the status 
quo, focus on advertising to build their brand, or introduce differentiated products, 
whether they desire to or not, to entice the distributors to pick up their product.235 The 
existing system forcibly constrains smaller craft brewers who must conform or fail.  
Stone Brewing Company, on its way to becoming the fastest growing brewery in 
the U.S.,236 challenged the industry standard by creating its own distribution network, 
bypassing the existing distribution bureaucracy to meet the demand of its customers and 
maximize profits.237 Stone recognized the limitations of the independent distribution 
system and created an alternative approach to supply its customers. The founders, Greg 
Koch and Steve Wagner, realized that to continue producing their products the way they 
wanted to would require circumventing the established distribution system.238 Koch and 
Wagner understood the great costs of developing a standalone distribution system, and 
they chose to collaborate with several other small up and coming brewers to create their 
distribution system. The innovation of a brewery owned distributor was disruptive to the 
market. Stone now determines and regulates its own inventory with each retailer account 
instead of an independent distributor. This improvement removed previous obstacles and 
allowed Stone to more carefully react to its customer’s sentiments, which in turn 
increased sales. Most importantly, Stone understood the needs of the market. Creating 
their own distribution system was the innovation that allowed Stone to capitalize on the 
demand signals of the market.  
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Another example of innovation through understanding market demand can be 
seen in the fast casual concept of the restaurant industry. Fast casual restaurants, a hybrid 
of the quick service and casual restaurant concepts, provide customizable, freshly 
prepared, and higher quality food from a counter service platform.239 The fast casual 
restaurant concept can be traced back to the early 1990s when restaurants like 
Fuddruckers and Au Bon Pain offered consumers, “a commitment to an elevated 
experience in food,”240 compared to the low-quality processed foods of their quick 
service competitors. More recent versions of this concept, like Chipotle Mexican Grill, 
have evolved to match the markets demand of “heightened interest in health, sourcing, 
ethics, and value.”241 Chipotle is described as “the best restaurant brand created in 10 or 
15 years,”242 and as the leader of the fast-casual restaurant style, is currently 
revolutionizing the fast food industry. The overall restaurant market has remained flat; 
however, the fast casual industry continues to grow, stealing customers from traditional 
quick service fast food restaurants.243 Innovations in restaurant design, food preparation 
and distribution, are being mimicked by many as the fast-casual movement is expected to 
continue to capture larger portions of the fast food market share.244 Chipotle’s acute 
awareness of market demand and its ability to deliver a matching product have made 
them an incredibly successful organization.  
Similar to Stone and Chipotle, Tesla is improving its ability to create applicable 
innovations by creating a closer relationship with customers. Tesla automobiles are only 
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sold directly to customers, not through a third party dealership. The customer provides 
feedback directly to the company, providing clearer communication of needs directly to 
the organization that has the most interest in incremental innovations and 
improvements.245 This reduces confusion and eliminates unnecessary bureaucratic links 
in the feedback process. 
Chipotle, Stone, IDEO, and Gore are all prominent leaders in their respective 
industries. These companies effectively utilize organizational practices such as 
decentralization, incentives, adaptable project teams, and understanding market demand 
to produce innovative products and teams that create incremental change and disruptions 
to their markets. These innovative practices have contributed to the success of these 
businesses in ever-changing complex environments.  
1. Conclusions 
 An autonomous flat lattice network of cross-functional teams creates an 
environment conducive to innovation and collaboration. “It’s tough to plan 
for innovation, but possible to organize for it.” 
 Innovative teams must be ruthlessly mission oriented, faced with a 
deadline, non-hierarchical, diverse, in a physical environment tailored for 
flexibility and brainstorming.  
 Teams must be empowered to seek outside expertise, connected to exterior 
networks, and failure must be viewed as part of the process. 
 Innovation is driven from the identification of a demand for a product or 
idea and the requirement to deliver it to the end user. 
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IV. COMPOUNDING FACTORS OF INNOVATION  
AND ADAPTATION 
A. COLLABORATION 
The organizations examined in the previous case studies used collaboration to 
increase collective intelligence and create value. They accomplished this through 
physical infrastructure design, establishing internal connections, and creating diverse 
external linkages to resources, ideas and end users. 
 Google, Gore, and IDEO used infrastructure design to force interaction 
and connectivity among members of the organization, and reduced 
impediments to work and communication. 
 JSOC used exchange programs and an all-members teleconference to 
connect the organization to itself; Google used a similar teleconference. 
  JSOC established a network of LNOs to connect itself to other entities 
and stakeholders to increase buy-in from other governmental 
organizations.  
 Silicon Valley similarly uses collaboration to create value, rather than 
forcing out competition. 
B. STRUCTURE 
Organizational structure plays a central role in the success of innovative and 
adaptive organizations. Gore CEO, Terri Kelly, summed it well with her comments that 
organizations can organize themselves for innovation.246 The cases revealed common 
structural components that increased the capability to innovate and adapt. Autonomous, 
ad-hoc, cross-functional teams were mission oriented, faced deadlines, were diverse, and 
operated in a physical environment tailored for flexibility. Leaders clearly articulated 
priorities and maintained a culture of open communication among echelons of the 
organization.  
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 Google, Gore, and IDEO organize cross-functional teams around 
specific projects.
 At Google, JSOC, IDEO, and Gore, leaders emphasized a common 
understanding of the mission and established priorities that shaped the 
culture of the organization.
C. INCENTIVES 
Incentive structures should align individual and group behavior with processes 
and actions that support innovation. Personnel must be well suited to working in 
uncertain environments defined by autonomy and constant communication with diverse 
groups of people. To meet this demand, organizations hire talented personnel and reward 
those who contribute to innovation, not just the leaders of innovative groups. In order to 
ensure that team members continue to pursue fresh ideas, failure must be viewed as part 
of the learning process for the organization. Additionally, environmental conditions 
surrounding the organizations must be conducive to collaboration and innovation. 
 Google uses a long and difficult hiring process to ensure they get the right 
type of employees. JSOC uses selection processes at all levels of the 
organization.
 Google, Gore, and IDEO use pay structures that avoid egalitarian pay, 
choosing instead to reward value-producing achievement.
 Environmental factors in Silicon Valley incentivize innovation and 
collaboration.
D. ACCEPTANCE 
Ideas must be accepted by the appropriate level of an organization in order to be 
implemented as innovation. Acceptance is the process of building buy-in for an idea 
within the organization and delivering the product to meet the demand of the end user. 
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 Stone and Chipotle studied the external environment and recognized a 
market demand. Process and product innovations allowed them to 
penetrate their markets in new ways.
 JSOC instituted a system of LNOs to sense and satisfy demand signals 
with buy-in across the interagency.
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A. APPLYING THE LESSONS LEARNED TO SPECIAL WARFARE UNITS 
The compounding factors of innovation identified in the previous chapter may be 
applied to special warfare units in several ways. Based on the research, prior experience, 
and knowledge of special warfare, this project group identified several applications of 
these factors. The examined cases indicate while a single factor can improve innovative 
capacity, combinations of factors provide exponential improvement. However, the 
implementation of each recommendation will incur a cost. As indicated by Luttwak, 
military forces cannot be organized to maximize both efficiency and adaptability.247 The 
recommendations for improving innovation must coincide with the acceptance of reduced 
efficiency. 
1. Career Flexibility 
Mintzberg asserts that organizations operating in uncertain environments must 
utilize an organic approach emphasizing flexibility and adaptability to succeed.248 
Organizations like Google, IDEO, and Gore are able to innovate and quickly adapt in part 
because of their ability to organically construct project teams for emerging challenges. 
Their project teams are diverse, constantly evolving, and networked. This environment 
sets conditions for adaptability, information flow, and access to expertise. These 
organizations benefit from the networks created by the flexible career paths of their 
employees. Similar flexibility within special warfare career management system is 
required in order to build a networked force with political, educational, and social capital.  
Currently, career progression milestones required for promotion of special 
warfare personnel mirror those of the conventional Army. Typical career timelines of 
those currently selected for battalion commands and higher also mirror conventional 
timelines and require specific duty assignments. This rigidity leaves little room for the 
                                                 
247 Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” 336. 
248 Henry Mintzberg, “Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit?,” Harvard Business Review (Jan-Feb 
1981): 4. 
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diversification and collaboration across non-DOD organizations that is needed to promote 
innovation within the special warfare force.249 The Army’s pre-requisites for promotion 
are designed to select leaders with the attributes that have proven to be successful for 
conducting attrition warfare.250  
However, special warfare forces are required to succeed in the uncertain 
environments of relational maneuver warfare.251 In order to allow special warfare forces 
the flexibility required to succeed in uncertain environments, USASOC should modify 
the career management model of special warfare forces. This will enable USASOC to 
build special warfare forces that are most capable of innovation and adaption instead of 
the current “up or out” model that creates leaders who exhibit characteristics that are 
successful in a machine bureaucracy. 252 When operating in an uncertain environment, the 
ability to adapt to changes and instability becomes a significant measure of effectiveness 
of the organization.253  
Special warfare forces should ensure leaders are selected for their ability to adapt 
in uncertain environments. Those leaders will exhibit the traits and characteristics of the 
innovative leaders and organizations consistent in the examined cases. Selection criteria 
for promotion or command should focus on those members who have demonstrated 
dedication to mission accomplishment, success in uncertainty, who possess a diverse 
network and experiences, feel empowered to challenge standard practices and embrace 
unorthodox paradigms, and seek outside expertise when necessary. Selected leaders 
would have demonstrated that they can clearly articulate missions and priorities and 
tirelessly maintain an ecosystem that gives subordinates the autonomy and resources to 
succeed.  
                                                 
249 This statement is based on the collective experience of the authors and their observations of the 
current career progression practices within USASOC and the Army.  
250 Charles Cleveland, former Commander of USASOC (lecture at Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, May 7, 2015). 
251 Cleveland, ARSOF 2022, 16. 
252 Charles Cleveland, former Commander of USASOC (lecture at Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, May 7, 2015). 
253 Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” 336. 
 67
Participation in the current HRC promotion and command selection boards should 
be maintained. However, as the proponent for accessions within USASOC, 
USAJFKSWCS must exert greater influence within the current processes to incentivize 
innovation and adaptation in complex and unstable environments. The Goldwater-
Nichols Act revolutionized military promotion in favor of joint capability, and requires 
joint duty assignment for promotion.254 Similarly, USASOC should assert influence to 
HRC promotion boards to ensure that interagency, special warfare liaison positions, and 
broadening opportunities are viewed as career enhancing and are weighted for promotion.  
In addition to these changes, USASOC should no longer implement “up or out” 
career advancement. Special warfare career progression should be flexible enough to 
allow for timeline adjustments such as year group jumps, forward and backward, based 
on performance, experience, and mission requirements. Broadening opportunities such as 
higher education or partnerships with industry that are deemed enhancing to special 
warfare must not jeopardize a career trajectory; instead they must be highly valued 
because they would further link special warfare forces with a diverse network.  
It must be noted that these changes do not exactly replicate the selection processes 
of the most innovative organizations discussed earlier, which generally utilize more 
subjective processes to promote and select project team leaders and managers.255 
Although a USASOC influenced incentive system would maintain some rigidity, over 
time a system that incentivizes innovation and adaptation would ensure that personnel 
displaying these key attributes matriculate to senior command positions. These leaders 
would manage selection criteria to reflect the needs of an agile innovative force. A 
USAJFKSWCS influenced career management system would have the ability shape the 
force to best meet the needs of conducting special warfare in uncertain environments. 
                                                 
254 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 , H.R. Rep. No. 3622 Title 
IV, Section 404 (1986). 
255 Kelley, The Art of innovation, 83–84. 
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2. Broadening Opportunities 
Achieving innovation requires diversity of thought. Common experiences and 
near-identical career paths throughout ARSOF limit diversity. The recent focus on a 
“Global SOF Network”256 and new initiatives such as the Volkmann project257 will 
contribute to innovative collaboration. This research supports both efforts, however, a 
network internal to the military world only does not offer the same benefits as one that 
also reaches into the civilian world. SOF operators across the globe can have remarkable 
similarities in culture and in thought processes.  
Expanding collaboration into other environments, such as the business world and 
non-governmental organizations, will increase the range from which ideas are 
incorporated. Furthermore, the experience of working in a different organization or 
studying in a different field changes the perspective of the participant. He or she will then 
return to the special warfare community with diversity of thought and the social capital to 
seek fresh ideas from previous contacts. Google utilizes their associate product manager 
program to foster innovation among rising stars of their organization by providing them 
with unique experiences around the world.258 
In order to build a collaborative, external network and have access to fresh ideas, 
members of the special warfare community must find ways to connect with outside 
agencies. Usually, opportunities to interact with other organizations are limited to 
deployments or an occasional embassy meeting. Military professionals are rarely exposed 
to environments that do not directly relate to their current position. They usually work on 
military bases and live in predominantly military areas, separated from the social circles 
of disparate industries. If given time to work among other groups and participate in 
educational programs that foster different ideas, they can establish linkages outside of 
military circles. The Army’s broadening opportunities program offers various means to 
                                                 
 256 Cleveland, ARSOF 2022. 
 257 A U.S. Special Operations initiative for officer exchange programs with allied nations. Eric 
Wendt, “The Green Beret Volkmann Project,” Special Warfare Volume 28 Issue 3 (September 2015). 
 258 Levy, In the Plex, 4. 
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interact and develop strong social capital in the outside world. This program is 
unfortunately limited in scope and availability.  
There are approximately 298 broadening opportunity slots available to the 
Army.259 Considering both active duty and reserve soldiers, these slots are only available 
to 0.105% of the Army. Accordingly, USASOC should develop and implement its own 
professional broadening opportunities. Congressional fellowship and training with 
industry programs are excellent pathways to develop social capital and expose leaders to 
diverse ideas. The Downing Scholarship awards approximately four officers a year with 
an opportunity to earn security studies degrees at top universities. Such a program would 
also potentially expose participants to future state department leaders as well former 
government senior appointees. USASOC must fine tune the program and assign 
participants to reliable, supportive members of the selected institution. A well-known, 
tenured professor with a background in security studies can guide participants and fulfill 
the intent of the program. 
Following the trend of Silicon Valley innovation leaders, the special warfare 
command must recognize that its size is a limiting factor in its ability to innovate. 
Companies like Google and Apple understand this and therefore pay close attention to 
garage start-ups that develop innovative ideas.260 The large, accomplished innovators 
integrate smaller companies into their umbrella organization, thereby capturing their 
potential for mutual benefit. The smaller, inexperience companies are desperate to 
demonstrate breakthrough innovations as it is the key to their survival.  
Similarly, there are hundreds of NGOs throughout the world, struggling to 
exercise innovative ideas to make a difference in developing countries and failed states. 
The special warfare community must build linkages to the world of NGOs and private 
military contractors who have the potential to enhance mission accomplishment. Special 
                                                 




260 Victor Luckerson, “How Google Perfected the Silicon Valley Acquisition,” TIME, April 15, 2015, 
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warfare units may reach out to these organizations, offering resources, support, and 
contracts. 
Selection criteria for broadening opportunities participants must be carefully 
considered and tailored to develop special skills. A candidate chosen to work with 
innovative businesses should have some knowledge of the assigned sector in order to add 
value to the organization. He or she must be of proven moral character in order to avoid 
negative and corruptive influences that can be found in the corporate world. A candidate 
chosen to work with the state department should have the intellect to gain the respect of 
experienced foreign service officers. 
In addition to providing these opportunities, the special warfare community must 
embrace the program. Special warfare units will need to support broadening opportunity 
initiatives by recommending top performers for specialized programs that will enhance 
an interagency network. An officer or NCO selected for such an assignment should be 
recognized as having high potential and not as one who missed the opportunity to spend 
more time with his or her unit. Current Army broadening opportunity programs often 
derail officers from competition for command. Officers, in particular, miss out on the 
performance evaluations to be competitive for the next promotion board. Special warfare 
leaders can eliminate this obstacle through command emphasis and the directing of 
branch proponents that define broadening opportunities as highly desirable experiences 
for promotion. Instead of attending basic intermediate level education (ILE), a field grade 
officer with high potential should be able to participate in a broadening opportunity as an 
alternative. 
3. Liaisons 
Another opportunity to increase social capital and networking is the use of 
liaisons. Strong ties should be developed with agencies with the potential to contribute to 
special warfare solutions. A valuable and experienced member of the special warfare 
community, can also benefit that agency and further strengthen ties and increase 
information flow. By increasing the flow of information and fostering a desire to be part 
of innovative solutions, the special warfare network expands its collaborative capabilities. 
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Learning from JSOC’s example, competent personnel must be placed in these 
positions. The liaison should be a top performer.261 His or her potential for promotion 
must also be maintained following liaison duties. A common practice in the special 
warfare community is to keep top performers in operational duty positions required for 
command track progression while the inexperienced and unproven personnel serve as 
liaisons. While this is efficient from a manning perspective, it does not contribute to 
adaptability and the development of social capital which supports innovation.  
The more crucial the partnered organization, the higher quality the liaison officer 
should be. In this way, the reputation of the special warfare community improves in the 
eyes of those who have the ability to add to the collaborative network. These liaisons are 
not only conduits of information, but must also offer special warfare solutions to assigned 
partners. They must add value and be a desirable addition. Persistent, respected presence 
in interagency decision-making processes will build equity and enhance reputation. 
Popular hubs build linkages quickly as demonstrated by the rising stars of Silicon 
Valley.262 When the interagency community finds value in working with special warfare 
units, the collaborative network will expand quickly. 
Liaisons can serve to build and participate in the cross-functional team system 
used so effectively by innovative organizations. State Department planners could benefit 
greatly from having a member of the special warfare community working on their team. 
JTF-B provided a full time LNO to the US Country Team in Honduras to facilitate IA 
collaboration.263 Their presence alone provided a conduit for quickly responding to task 
force requests for information. They also had the ability to report State Department 
dilemmas to their own command which, in turn, offered solutions. There may be 
significant resistance to such close cooperation due to culture and divergent goals. A 
special warfare professional, trained in dealing with unique cultures and complex 
situations, should respect the needs of the partner and continue to build rapport. 
                                                 
261 LTG Tony Thomas, current JSOC Commander (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, October 20, 2015). 
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Consequently, the liaison will develop diversity of thought from the experience and bring 
those lessons learned back to the parent unit.  
The temporary unavailability of successful leaders as a result of participation in 
networking and liaison opportunities is problematic for commands. Competent officers 
and NCOs will have to be pulled from crucial positions in order to interact outside of the 
community. This is a significant cost to the organization. Increases in collaboration and 
coordination by utilizing critical personnel for networking and liaison positions reduces 
internal efficiency. It already takes significant efforts to complete all the administrative 
and operations tasks for current requirements. Most staffs cannot afford to give up key 
members to outside organizations. More importantly, most active units cannot give up 
personnel because they are needed for deployment. Any commander who is seeking to 
expand innovative capacity and make their organization more adaptable must accept this 
cost. 
An effort towards organizational innovation should coincide with the recognition 
and preparation of reduced efficiency. Shifting priorities and reporting requirements may 
reduce the workload and manpower requirements of the staff. This, in turn, will free up 
personnel for liaison positions. Liaison positions can also become authorized billets and 
added to a unit’s table of organization and equipment (TOE). This will eliminate the 
inefficiency associated with reduced staffing to fill liaison positions. 
There is no concrete measure of effectiveness for the benefits of collaboration. A 
leader may not know that a member of his staff created a solution by reaching out to a 
contact in an outside agency. The solutions facilitated by other agencies derived from 
collaborating with military liaisons will not always attribute credit to the right people. 
However, the collective benefit will be enhanced if key players are not overly concerned 
with sharing credit.264 Just as popular hubs in Silicon Valley contribute greatly to the 
overall innovative capacity of the industry, the special warfare community can be a 
central node of information flow and a leader in national security solutions. 
                                                 
264 Stanley McChrystal (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 14, 2015). 
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4. Cross-Functional Teams 
As seen in the cases of Google, Gore, and IDEO, organizing in cross-functional 
teams is a useful tool that enables organizations to adapt to uncertain environments. 
Teams composed of people with different backgrounds and skillsets create diversity of 
thought and linkages within the organization necessary for innovation.265 In these 
adaptive organizations, cross-functional teams are a way of life in response to the 
environment, not something that is done simply in an emergency or crisis. 
Former USASOC Commander LTG Charles Cleveland stated that one of the 
driving ideas behind the ARSOF 2022 vision is to operationalize special warfare forces 
prior to deployment. This is done by focusing efforts to “aggregate and disaggregate 
command and control” against problem sets in the geographic combatant commands.266 
As a force provider, USASOC has the leading role in developing special warfare forces 
capable of acting as C2 nodes and cross-functional teams. By nature of disparate unit 
locations and the current organizational design, these forces often meet for the first time 
in theater, forcing the formation of the cross-functional team under operational 
conditions. Uncertainty in the operational environment will always create friction in the 
forecasting of force requirements. Therefore, great emphasis should be placed on the 
creation and operation of special warfare cross-functional teams in the force generation 
process, forcing habitual relationships between special warfare forces within 1st SWC. 
The idea is not to perfectly predict which individuals or teams will deploy together, but to 
train and continuously improve the practice of forming and exercising special warfare 
cross-functional teams.  
An organization connected to itself through horizontal coordination measures 
increases its collective intelligence.267 To this end, one tool used by Google and JSOC is a 
regularly occurring meeting forum where all members of the organization can brief and 
discuss operations, critical issues, and organizational initiatives. Disparate unit locations, 
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areas of operation, and the sheer number of special warfare forces in USASOC prevent a 
single forum meeting or video teleconference (VTC) from being a realistic option. A 
more useful option may be the implementation of a regularly occurring situation and 
operations update between special warfare forces and their aligned TSOC. This forum 
would regularly include special warfare forces at the tactical and operational levels to 
support idea flow between special warfare forces and keep CONUS forces in tune with 
operational developments in theater. Furthermore, the shared consciousness between 
special warfare forces can reinforce the aggregation of cross-functional teams.  
Special warfare forces should remain cognizant of the costs associated with 
implementing programs and processes to increase innovation and adaptability. However, 
these recommendations, informed by the compounding factors of innovation identified in 
this study, could render special warfare forces better postured to operate in uncertainty. 
Organizational enhancements that bolster innovation and adaptability will improve 
special warfare forces’ contributions to national defense. 
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